The anti-apartheid movements in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand

By Peter Limb

Introduction

The history of the anti-apartheid movement(s) (AAM) in Aotearoa/New Zealand and Australia is one of multi-faceted solidarity action with strong international, but also regional and historical dimensions that gave it specific features, most notably the role of sports sanctions and the relationship of indigenous peoples’ struggles to the AAM. Most writings on the movement in Australia are in the form of memoirs, though Christine Jennett in 1989 produced an analysis of it as a social movement. New Zealand too has insightful memoirs and fine studies of the divisive 1981 rugby tour. The movement’s internal history is less known. This chapter is the first history of the movement in both countries. It explains the movement’s nature, details its history, and discusses its significance and lessons.¹

The movement was a complex mosaic of bodies of diverse forms: there was never a singular, centralised organisation. Components included specific anti-apartheid groups, some of them loose coalitions, others tightly focused, and broader supportive organisations such as unions, churches and NGOs. If activists came largely from left-wing, union, student, church and South African communities, supporters came from a broader social range.

The liberation movement was connected organically not only through politics, but also via the presence of South Africans, prominent in Australia, if rather less so in New Zealand. The political configuration of each country influenced choice of alliance and depth of interrelationships. Forms of struggle varied over time and place. There were internal contradictions and divisive issues, and questions around tactics, armed struggle and sanctions, and how to relate to internal racism. These issues were

largely resolved owing to a clear focus on ending apartheid that allowed unity in action.

Solidarity was a central pillar of anti-apartheid campaigns. Solidarity has a habit of overflowing narrow bounds of nations or movements and having multiple meanings. The movement worldwide has been characterised as ‘a network of local, national and transnational groups and institutions’, a globalised new social movement or ‘imagined community of solidarity activists’ that skilfully used media and information to combat the misinformation of apartheid and its backers. This too was the case in Australasia.2

The movement’s rise ‘Down Under’ coincided with wider social change. Sports sanctions became the major focus of campaigns, though financial sanctions were significant in the late 1980s. Some governments were strongly anti-apartheid. Government policy in Australia after 1972 and New Zealand from 1984 was broadly anti-apartheid, yet that does not mean the task was easy. In addition, there was a close connection, often a source of internal tension, yet also strength, between action against apartheid and fighting local racism.3

Early relations with South Africa: From empire to apartheid

Australia–New Zealand relations with South Africa were broad, ranging from migration and trade to culture. After British colonisation, the three settler societies shared traditions. White Australians viewed the Cape as a vital communication link, which led to constant, if moderate, largely white, migration. South African communities were larger in Australia than New Zealand and a double-edged sword for the anti-apartheid movement. White people both criticised and defended apartheid: the South Africa Club of Western Australia (WA) in 1969 entertained visiting South African warships and empathised with Vorster. The few black people able to migrate often did so to escape racism. Yet, many dedicated and politicised South Africans of all races formed a solid pillar of the movement.4

Before 1961, when South Africa became a republic, there were political similarities: common head of state, Westminster political system, dominion status, and service under Britain in wars. Expressions of ‘colonial solidarity’ with South Africa occurred: in 1906 Australasian parliamentarians protested British ‘interference’ with the execution of Bhambatha resistance fighters.5

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3 Interview with T. Richards, Paris, 4 June 2005.
Indigenous peoples in each country faced white invasion, long frontier wars, and land loss. The virulent effects of subjugation were similar as settlers adopted historico-legal fictions of the ‘empty land’. Legislation embodied commonly held ideas of white superiority. Land and citizenship were denied black people, who were herded in reserves, paid minimal wages, and subject to draconian segregation. Maori, if gaining some formal legal equality after the Treaty of Waitangi, progressively also had most of their land stolen. A major difference was that black labour was in demand in South Africa, not Australasia. There were close similarities in racist policies: the 1897 Natal Act, a model already adopted by WA and New South Wales (NSW), inspired Australia’s 1901 Immigration Restriction Act and New Zealand’s 1899 Act. Indigenous women were victims of gross sexual and labour exploitation. Before 1948, differences faded away in common membership of the ‘Dominion Club’.6

Stereotyping was apparent in prison administration. Rottnest Island (WA) and Robben Island shared a role as penal isles incarcerating exiled anti-colonial fighters. Another slender link was Garveyism. In the 1920s, Garveyists in Australia and South Africa read of each other’s struggles, with the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association influenced by visiting black sailors.7

There were early diplomatic contacts. In 1907, Alfred Deakin sent Transvaal Prime Minister Louis Botha details of the White Australia Policy. Prime Minister Fisher in 1910 attended the Act of Union of ‘our new sister nation’. Travelling with him, Ambrose Pratt presciently noted ‘the coming generation of natives will put forward a demand for full political enfranchisement so powerful that the whites will be unable to resist it, except in arms’. In the immediate post 1945 period, the two states collaborated on nuclear power, agriculture, and Antarctica. An indirect community of interests influenced by images of South Africa among Australians underlay relations: a waning position held by ‘a Menzies generation’, shielding apartheid from attack; a view among business and sportspeople, emphasising common lifestyle; and common aims rooted in political change.8

Economic ties influenced political relations. British investment was heavy in both regions. South Africa was, from 1906 to 1922, the only dominion to share reciprocal tariffs with Australia, whose trade with South Africa, if small compared with Europe, in 1913 was second only to New Zealand in the Empire. By 1970, Australia was fourth of Pretoria’s partners. South African exports increased fourfold, in 1978 becoming Australia’s fifth largest source of manufactures. From 1965 to 1992, Australian exports rose from A$22m to A$334m. Companies such as BHP, IXL and UK/US-owned subsidiaries profited from trade with apartheid, even at the expense of Australian jobs.

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Investment in Australia by South African companies rose in the 1970s, notably in mining, with strong representation of De Beers and Anglo-American on Chambers of Mines. Gold attracted 5,000 Australians to the Rand. By the turn of the century, migration of Australian artisans with ideas of exclusivist craft unionism and job colour bars provided South Africa with a model of a rigid labour market.9

The left of the labour movement forged ties. Communist parties were in the vanguard of developing nonracial policies: in the 1920s the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), Communist Party of Australia (CPA), and Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) began to express, if largely in theory, solidarity with indigenous peoples. In 1921, the CPA’s *Proletarian* noted that the fall of colour bars would herald ‘a real South African proletarian’. The Comintern, seeing parallels, in 1926 instructed all three parties to pay serious attention to colonial racism. Just as the CPSA adopted the Black Republic in 1927, so in 1931 the CPA adopted an Aboriginal rights programme demanding equal wages and independent black republics. Both the CPA and CPSA were ultimately, if temporarily, banned: in the 1940s briefly in Australia, in 1950 in South Africa.10

In the 1950s, unions forged solidarity with the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). When SACTU and Albert Luthuli called for sanctions in 1959, the Seamen’s Union of Australia (SUA) and Waterside Workers’ Federation (WWF) embargoed South African ships, a move Gertrude Shope recalls ‘caused rejoicing in the black townships’. Attempts by Menzies to criminalise union sanctions made progressives more determined to support SACTU, which in turn in 1960 resolved to ‘always defend the right of Australian workers’. Australian clothing unions expressed solidarity as early as 1952. Unionist Audrey McDonald met African Food and Canning Workers’ Union (AFCWU) and ANC Women’s League (ANCWL) leader Elizabeth Mafekeng who, when banned in 1959, received strong support from Australia. In March 1960, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) condemned Sharpeville and called for boycotts. In Sydney, police arrested unionists protesting the massacre. Intensified attacks on SACTU prompted increased solidarity: in 1961, the Australian Railways Union protested attacks on the South African Railways and Harbour Workers’ Union. Through the 1960s, ACTU condemned apartheid.11

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At the other end of the political spectrum, conservatives built ties. In the early 1920s New South Wales politician Thomas Henley visited South Africa, writing a trenchant pamphlet appealing for Australia to be ‘kept white’ lest it lose a tussle with a South Africa based on cheap black labour. In the apartheid era, conservatives such as Menzies and Charles Court craved closer relations.12

Cultural relations also influenced the pattern of the anti-apartheid movement. A major point of contact was sporting rivalry, the intensity of which made sporting sanctions the bitterest chapter in relations. Rugby, the favourite sport of Afrikaners, enabled them ‘to indulge their continued animus towards the sons of the British Empire’. Rugby administration was at the centre of apartheid power, with most Springbok touring managers Broederbonders. Rugby thus had a ‘special significance for the Afrikaner elite’ although, as Peter Utting notes, it also was the ‘soft underbelly’ of apartheid. There was a prehistory to this conflict, longer and deeper in New Zealand than in Australia.13

Highly significant was the slight felt by many New Zealanders when in 1921 a South African journalist, Blackett, made racist comments, of Springboks ‘forced’ to play Maori and the ‘spectacle of thousands of Europeans frantically cheering on a band of coloured men to defeat members of their own race’. Maori took grave exception. Maori champion rugby player George Nepia wrote, ‘from the Maori point of view, nothing could have been worse … the hurt which was then done has never been forgotten and never quite forgiven’. In 1928, a touring team deselected Nepia under South African pressure, ‘a deliberate and conciliatory act’ by New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU). Akarana Maori Association condemned this ‘slur on the dignity and manhood of the Maori’. The insult was remembered and 1936/7 saw ‘the first organised, nationwide protest’ against the rugby relationship, driven by Maori leaders Te Puea Herangi and Tai Mitchell. The white press supported Maori protests, if paternalistically, but, as Greg Ryan notes, these early protests did not raise the predicament of black people in South Africa. Further exclusion of Maori in a 1948 tour saw muted criticism by Maori, unions and war hero Howard Kippenberger. ‘No Maori – No Tour’ became the slogan of 1960 protests and the issue remained a flashpoint. Part of the fierce opposition to exclusion was a notion of many Pākehā (white New Zealanders) that theirs was a country free of racism, in contrast to more openly self-conscious racism of Australia. Maori, who had suffered dispossession and endured racism, did not see it this way, but the notion was so widespread that Natal colonial official James Stuart had told ANC founder Pixley Seme in 1925 ‘there was an absence of discrimination in New Zealand’.14


Intellectual connections, which included the Rhodes Trust and Round Table, were more one-way: Australians and some New Zealanders wrote on South Africa, not vice versa. Historian Fred Alexander in 1949–50 met Smuts, Malan, and ANC president James Moroka. In the 1950s, he urged Australian academics to protest apartheid, yet failed to stimulate debates on South Africa. All this shared history influenced the terrain of the anti-apartheid movement.

Apartheid’s opponents: Formation of the anti-apartheid movements

The issue of apartheid best symbolises changes in these relations. Before 1960, there was considerable bi-partisan Australian/New Zealand support for white South Africa, based on legalistic doctrines of non-interference in domestic affairs and shared ideologies of anti-communism and white supremacy. There were close (if small scale) trade and defence links, and extensive sporting ties.

The conservative Menzies government supported South Africa, voting with it in the UN. Australia’s foreign minister conceded privately he had made ‘as good a plug as [he] could for South Africa’. When Thomas Boydell visited Australia as cultural ambassador of apartheid, he had the support of Menzies, who had visited South Africa in 1953 and 1957. Menzies refused to condemn Sharpeville. Verwoerd expressed his ‘deep sense of gratitude’, noting Australia was viewed (by white people) as the ‘best friend South Africa has’. Menzies maintained personal contact with ambassadors and, in 1961 and 1963, torpedoed attempts by more liberal ministers to strengthen measures against Pretoria, in 1963 overriding departmental advice against a military attaché. Support continued under his immediate successors. Australia took no action to curb trade and represented South Africa’s interests on the IMF, generally ignoring UN sanctions.

In the 1950s, conservative governments defended Pretoria from UN sanctions and opposed freedom in Namibia, using the excuse of ‘domestic jurisdiction’. They did so out of concerns over security and anti-colonialism, and to protect racist immigration policies. Finally in 1958 the New Zealand Labour government (1957–60) voted for the first time in favour of India’s UN resolution condemning treatment of Indian South Africans, but Wellington continued to subscribe to the same belief in domestic jurisdiction and anti-communism as Australia. In the early 1960s, New Zealand even sought to secure South Africa’s re-admittance to the Commonwealth. African members viewed this as giving ‘tacit acquiescence’ to apartheid. However, a grassroots movement was starting to emerge.

There had been determined, if small, protests in 1949 and 1956 around exclusion of Maori from touring teams. In 1956, racism and lack of strong organisation limited protests, but exclusion of Maori challenged a widely held notion of racial equality. This was evident in public indignation at Maori deselection in the 1960 touring team that spawned New Zealand Citizens’ All Black Tour Association (CABTA) in July 1959. Five hundred people attended and it soon had twenty branches. Maori, students, churches and unions condemned the tour. CABTA organised a mass petition of 156,000 names and a protest of 2,000 in Auckland, led by Maori Battalion Commander Pita Awatere. A notable feature was the mushrooming of citizen’s groups. Churches were active, protesters occupied rugby grounds, students ran onto an airport runway. Labour Prime Minister Nash, if personally opposed to apartheid, did not wish to confront what was then an unpopular cause in New Zealand, but faced determined action in ‘the greatest national public controversy for a generation’.

A foundation was thus laid for later mass action, testifying to a deeply felt anti-racist ethos by many New Zealanders, expressed by Maori leader Maharia Winiata, who accused Wellington of trying not to antagonise Pretoria, and by Nepia who wrote, Maori ‘disliked this treatment of the millions whose skins were the same colour as ours’. The joint Maori–Pakeha anti-apartheid marches in 1960 heartened Nepia: ‘We were one people’. It was, however, to be a long march.

Protests of the 1950s did not stop tours, but they bred a hardy group of anti-apartheid activists. Pita Awatere went on to lead Maori land rights protests; his daughter Donna was active in 1981 protests. Peter Utting grew up in a society ‘indoctrinated with the All Black–Springbok rivalry’, but his father’s activism and his own exposure to Maori culture changed him. In 1956, appalled by the derogatory comments of visiting Springbok players, he joined lecturer Richard Thompson for the first protest on a rugby field. In response to Sharpeville, Utting and colleagues carried a coffin around Cathedral Square in Christchurch for a week in solidarity, 24 hours a day, in shifts.

At first, there was little direct contact with South Africa, but Dennis Brutus, later to play a vital role in focusing the movement on sanctions, had early engagements with people from Down Under. In Port Elizabeth in the 1950s, the captain of a touring New Zealand cricket team agreed to meet Brutus, who later took Australian cricketers Barry Jarman and Lindsay Klein to watch a black team. When the South African Sports Association was formed in 1958, Brutus coordinated a ‘No Maori – No Tour’ petition of 8,000 names that was smuggled out by Archbishop de Blank, but ignored by Prime Minister Nash, whose blasé policy lost him Maori votes and contributed to his defeat by Holyoake’s National Party (NP), which opposed sanctions. Newspapers spoke fearfully

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19 Nepia, I, George Nepia, 154-5.

The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 3, International Solidarity, Part II

of ‘Afro-Asian’ dominance in the Commonwealth’. New Zealand had little economic stake in southern Africa, yet the Chamber of Commerce sought to expand trade.21

Despite the persistence of racism, the movement’s form was changing. In the early 1960s, organisations were still largely uncoordinated so individuals played a key role: Canterbury University academic Richard Thompson kept the issue alive in publications. In 1964, a more coherent body emerged when prominent anti-racists Frank Haig and Keith Sorrenson formed the Citizens’ Association for Racial Equality (CARE) in Auckland. It opposed apartheid and racism at home and abroad, and supported IDAF. Branches formed in other cities; the Christchurch body saw itself as independent. Tom Newnham in Auckland soon became its most prominent leader. CARE protested all forms of racism, but was criticised for not paying enough attention to local racism.22

A Springbok tour eventuated in 1965. Maori MP Matiu Rata stated ‘no Maori with a conscience could welcome the Springboks’. CARE organised protests, but received limited support, given a widespread notion, encouraged by South African Rugby Board president Danie Craven, that a 1967 tour would resolve Maori exclusions. Nonetheless, the politicisation of South African sport was evident in Verwoerd’s September 1965 Loskop Dam speech in which he indicated that visiting teams must abide by apartheid rules. Holyoake deemed that a team chosen on racial lines could not represent the country. Soon, however, Verwoerd’s successor Vorster, under increasing pressure from the West, began cosmetic changes to woo back traditional sporting allies such as New Zealand, helping to precipitate a right-wing split from his National Party.23

In 1968, New Zealanders began to speak out against a return tour: ‘Significantly these were Maori voices.’ Sydney Jackson of the New Zealand Federation of Maori Students, stated ‘No Maori should go to South Africa, for how can we, when seeking equality, go to a country which actively denies another coloured people the rights we either enjoy, want extended or striving to achieve for ourselves.’ Now the campaign became specifically anti-apartheid and linked to soaring Maori unemployment, discrimination, and direct solidarity with South African black people. ‘We are coloured too,’ stated Jackson. This pricked Newnham’s conscience: what was CARE doing about it?24

Pressure for change grew. In both New Zealand and Australia the relationship of racism, indigenous peoples’ struggles and the anti-apartheid movement was complex. Terry Bell observes, ‘the AAM sprang directly out of local anti-racist

21 Interview with D. Brutus, Flint, Michigan, 8 April 2006; Dennis Brutus Interviewed (Marrickville: [1969]); T. Newnham, Apartheid Is Not a Game (Auckland: Graphic, 1975), 16; Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid, 93; McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, 234ff; K. Sorrenson, New Zealand and the Rhodesia Crisis (Auckland: Citizens’ Association for Racial Equality (CARE), 1968).
campaigns’. Maori were trailblazers. Irene Gale, an Australian who moved to New Zealand, sees the movement as growing out of Maori struggles. Their leaders developed their own analysis related to discrimination; a petition against the 1960 tour drawn up by Maori Anglican Bishop Wiremu Netana Panapa invoked the Treaty of Waitangi’s promise of equality. There were divisions. Inclusion of ‘honorary white’ Maori in a 1970 tour of South Africa was accepted by the government-funded Maori Council, but rejected as an ‘insult to the Maori race’ by the Maori Women’s Welfare League. From the late 1960s, Maori publications Te Hokioi and MOOHR (Maori Organisation on Human Rights) married local anti-racist with anti-apartheid struggles. There also was depth in wider community anti-racism: Pakeha truly believed they were not racist, even if in the 1950s they had ‘Europeans Only’ neon signs on hotels.25

Australia too began to move away from racism, partly as a response to black empowerment in Africa and America and the rise of black consciousness, and partly due to political change. Aboriginal leaders made embarrassing comparisons between Australia and apartheid. UN reports compared their conditions with those of South African black people. With South Africa out of the Commonwealth and a need for better relations with Afro-Asian states, Australia from 1961 made quiet diplomatic noises about apartheid. Unions, the Australian Labor Party (ALP), students and academics sought to educate Australians about apartheid. Anti-apartheid groups formed, with South African émigrés prominent.26

John Brink had been chairperson of the Liberal Party Pretoria Branch and a friend of Albert Luthuli, who had burnt his pass on 26 March 1960 when ‘staying in the home of white Pretoria friends, the Brinks – a home distinguished by a complete absence of any hint of colour bar’. Soon after, Brink went to prison for 93 days, going on a hunger strike and sharing a cell with Joe Slovo. Brink’s wife Margaret was a teacher with an Australian father who nurtured her anti-racism: her parents served on the joint councils in the twenties. Meg Brink taught in black schools, illegal Marabastad night schools and Trevor Huddleston’s Sophiatown school, and was active in the Liberal Party and Black Sash.27

The Brinks fled to Sydney in 1961. Meg organised Black Sash protests and spoke against apartheid at schools and churches, John ran a race relations bookshop. Australians, Meg recalls, were incredulous about lack of free elections in South Africa – hence explaining the nature of apartheid was urgent. The Brinks in 1963 established the Southern African Defence and Aid Fund in Australia (SADAF) with the help of prominent Australians such as Edward St John (International Commission of Jurists

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observer at the Treason Trial in 1959), left-wing writer Helen Palmer, and other émigrés Derek Marsh and David and Rona Ovedoff.28

Another émigré, Colin Tatz, had suffered anti-Semitism in 1940s Johannesburg. After ‘watching friend after friend after friend go down like ten pin bowling pins on all sorts of extraordinary charges of treason’ he left for Australia in 1961. In Canberra, Tatz became researcher for a short-lived Committee for Human Rights in South Africa. He sought to convince cabinet ministers that many émigrés deemed ‘communists’ under the South African 1951 Suppression of Communism Act were not in fact such, and a few such people were later granted entry. It was SADAF, however, which forged the first viable anti-apartheid structure.29

In SADAF, St John’s elitism – he excluded communists until 1969 when open membership was conceded – helped keep the group small. He did contact the OAU, but progress was slow in a conservative society: a 1963 exchange with media tycoon Frank Packer captures the political climate of the day: Packer emphatically declared he would never sponsor SADAF, recommended Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi as a model for Africa, and suggested St John confine his energy to Australian causes. St John retorted that ‘humane feelings should scarcely be limited to the shores of our own country’.30

SADAF raised funds to help South African political prisoners and informed Australians about apartheid. As a small middle-class body it had limited reach, raising perhaps only A$2,000 a year, but it publicised apartheid crimes through a newsletter and press letters. In 1968, it protested the awarding of a contract for the Sydney Eastern Suburbs Railway to a South African company. An indication of its success was securing as patrons prominent Australians such as writers Patrick White and Judith Wright and future prime minister Gough Whitlam. Consciousness of events developed slowly, but during the 1963/4 South African cricket tour, the pitch was dug up and balls thrown onto the field.31

If SADAF was moderate and middle class, then Friends of Africa (FOA), formed in Sydney in 1967, was left wing, union-based and radical. Leaders included Alf Watt (Building Workers’ Industrial Union (BWIU) secretary) and Hazel Jones, a communist and feminist, who had grown up in Kenya and became resolutely anti-racist. A few years earlier, Norman Jeffrey and Frank O’Sullivan (BWIU) had organised a short-lived South Africa Committee and protested 1963 tours. FOA disseminated information on ‘people’s struggles’ to ‘initiate and encourage solidarity actions with the freedom fighters of Africa’. The focus was apartheid and colonialism. FOA successfully

28 Mitchell Library Ms6630, HJP: Southern Africa Defence and Aid Fund in Australian records 1961-81; Brink, Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika, 36; M. Brink interview; ‘John and Margaret Brink’; P. McGregor interview, Perth 7 October 2005; South Africa a Survey by South Africans in Australia (Sydney: Outlook, 1963), 2.
29 Interview (telephonic) with C. Tatz, Sydney, 9 August 2005.
31 ‘John and Margaret Brink’; Brink, Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika; SADAF Newsletter (September 1968); HJP: St John to P. White, 15 October 1963; M. Brink interview.

FOA made contact with the liberation movement, encouraging unions to do the same. In Africa in 1965, Watt had met ‘many … freedom fighters’. In 1967/8, he corresponded with the ANC and SACP on aid and armed struggle, circularising unions with ANC needs. Some unions, the CPA’s Tribune and the Miners Union Common Cause took up the issue. The ANC’s Alfred Kgokong in Morogoro wrote that FOA’s aims were ‘most commendable’. Confirming what Watt had heard from the SACP’s Michael Harmel, ANC treasurer Moses Kotane wrote ‘we urgently need arms, funds, food, medicines, soaps, disinfectants, clothing, boots, tinned foodstuffs, blankets, jerseys and all types of transport’. FOA circulated sections of a Harmel letter and a Joe Slovo Sechaba article on the new phase marked by armed struggle to explain to Australians ANC needs.\footnote{FOA Records: A. Kgokong to Watt, 21 January 1968; Watt to ‘Mike’ [Harmel], 12 November 1967; FOA circular, 17 November 1967; M. Kotane to FOA, 18 December 1967; J. Matlou to Watt, 29 June 1968; FOA circular, 14 June 1968; FOA minutes, 18 June, 4 July 1968; Common Cause, 22 June 1968; Africa Newsletter (FOA), 1 (1968); J. Slovo, The Revolt Spreads (Sydney: Friends of Africa, nd.).}

Contacts widened. In 1969, FOA corresponded with SWAPO. Earlier, in 1966, the Union of Australian Women (UAW) also had expressed solidarity after the Australian judge on the International Court of Justice voted to maintain South African imperial interests. In 1970, FOA advised the ANC of a ‘great unawareness’ about apartheid and of the presence of South Africans who ‘vehemently support’ Vorster. FOA sent A$50 towards printing Sechaba, which they found a ‘valuable source of information’. It assisted anti-apartheid tours, liaised with interstate groups, and publicised issues via its newsletter, the media and distribution of the ANC’s Spotlight and Sechaba. In 1968, FOA launched a petition against executions. It lobbied government but Prime Minister Gorton told Jones in 1969 it could not intervene in ‘domestic jurisdiction’ and National Party minister Ian Sinclair revealed South Africa was ‘a market of growing importance’. The FOA had wider influence. It gained an undertaking from Malaysia not to host a planned hockey visit, and forged ties across the Tasman Sea with the NZ Race Relations Council. Despite this work, FOA had limited success. Just as SADAF over-relied on the middle class, so FOA ‘failed to involve people outside the labour movement’. By the end of 1970, with the rise of anti-Vietnam War protests, interest in FOA was dwindling.\footnote{FOA Records: S. Bunting (Anti-Apartheid Movement – AAM) to Watt, 13 May 1968; S. Mifima (South West African Peoples Organisation – SWAPO) to FOA, 3 February 1969; P. Appolus to UAW, 19 October 1966; FOA to ANC, 26 October 1970; Watt to Australian, 16 January 1968; FOA minutes, 26 March, 23 April 1968, 4 July 1968, 25 November 1969; J. Gorton to H. Jones, 30 June 1969; I. Sinclair to Jones, 29 May 1969; Malaysia High Commissioner to FOA, 12 March 1970; H. Jones to J. Gale, 5 November 1970.}

In Melbourne, South Africa Protest (SAP) was formed in 1963 by Philip Maclagan. In the same year, it protested with students and the communist Eureka Youth League against a South African cricket team. SAP was in touch with Helen Joseph and sent money direct to the Johannesburg Human Rights Welfare Committee or IDAF. SAP
worked hard to expose apartheid’s crimes, organising an Australia-wide petition for
sanctions, paid anti-apartheid advertisements, public meetings and marches, as well
as assisting tours of Solly Sachs and Robbie Resha. SAP’s Report exposed domestic
worker exploitation under apartheid and the pro-South African propaganda of The
Australian newspaper. By 1967, SAP had 100 members. It played a coordinating
role. Helen Palmer observed in 1968 that SAP ‘has supporters all over Australia’.
SADAF Secretary Garth Nettheim noted there were bodies with ‘similar objectives’
in Canberra and, less actively, Perth and Adelaide with a ‘nucleus of support’ in
Newcastle, Armidale, Brisbane, and Rockhampton. In isolated Perth, a small, largely
university based anti-apartheid group including Kay Kruger, Mary Wheeldon and
Judy Forsyth helped with petitions. All these groups had limited impact, but together
helped lay a foundation for wider actions soon stimulated by overseas contact.35

Direct contact with the liberation movement came in 1966 when SADAF sponsored
a visit by ANC director of international affairs Robbie Resha. At Sydney University a
meeting organised by Meredith Burgmann attracted 1 000 people, a union function
was well attended, and there were five TV interviews. In October, Resha toured
NSW and Queensland under SADAF’s auspices, and Victoria, South Australia and
Canberra with SAP. In Melbourne, a well attended meeting was organised by SAP,
World University Service, and South African exile Saul Bastomsky, who had arrived
on an exit permit the year before following a banning order. He recalls that in the
1960s formal anti-apartheid organisation in Melbourne remained weak.36

Catholic priest Richard Buchhorn took Resha north to rural Tamworth, Taree,
and Armidale where he addressed meetings. Buchhorn was in touch with Sydney
activists such as the Brinks and in Tamworth helped distribute leaflets against a 1963
tour. Resha also toured New Zealand. Tom Newnham recalls him as the movement’s
first overseas visitor. He spoke at Auckland Town Hall to 300–400 people. After the
tour, Harmel conveyed to Watt that Resha confirmed his ‘fine reception’ in Australia,
but ‘the problem is just how best we can mobilise all the political support’. Activists
scattered across Australia and New Zealand then started to lay down a foundation of
closer contacts and new structures.37

Influenced by Resha’s tour, the New Zealand Defence and Aid Fund for Southern
Africa (NZDAF) was formed in March 1967 along the lines of SADAF. Chaired by
Reverend Godfrey Wilson, it worked with CARE. NZDAF’s first year saw limited
progress, but persistent lobbying paid off when Labour Opposition leader Norman
Kirk met with the body in 1971, later as prime minister authorising state donations
to the UN Trust Fund, a practice continued by the conservatives. Earlier in 1969,
tours of Dennis Brutus and SACTU’s Phyllis Altman dramatically spurred a rise in

35 FOA Records: J. Maclagan to J. Brink, 20 July 1963; AARD circular, 20 February 1973; HJP: G. Nettheim to D. Finlay, 1
36 Brink, Nkosi Sikelel’iAfrika; interview with M. Burgmann, Sydney, 2 November 2005. HJP: ‘Robert Resha’ mimeo, 1966,
M. Mejarey to Brink, 11 October 1966, Nettheim to Maclagan, 26 May 1966; interview with S. Bastomsky, Melbourne,
28 October 2005 and his correspondence with Chief Magistrate Pietermaritzburg 1965, Resha meeting leaflet, 1966.
37 Interview (telephonic) with L. Watson and R. Buchhorn, Brisbane, 8 September 2005; Newnham, I. Gale interviews;
activity. At a fund meeting in February 1969, Brutus brought greetings from IDAF’s Canon Collins.\(^{38}\)

By the end of the 1960s, anti-apartheid forces in both countries increasingly focused on sports boycotts, inspired by tours of Brutus, president of the South African Nonracial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC, formed in 1963). Over two weeks he visited every major city, spoke on radio/TV, to churches, parliamentarians, unionists, students and Maori leaders. He began to see the complexity of ‘rugby politics’ that could, and did, turn elections, and also similarities between South African and New Zealand struggles. The tour was timely: Newnham remarks that ‘anti-tour feeling was everywhere, but it needed to be harnessed by the media, by books, and then later by Brutus.’\(^{39}\)

The movement increasingly recognised the value of media. It began to create its own media and works of art. Brutus’ poetry was an inspiration. He did poetry readings in New Zealand and Australia, shared a platform with Aboriginal poet Oodgeroo (Kath Walker) and wrote poems dedicated to Nelson Mandela. With Brutus due to fly to Australia, an incident brought attention to the fledgling movement. He refused to complete a form requesting his race and on arrival in Sydney made use of the publicity to remind Australians they were still seen in South Africa as ‘sisters of the South’ due to their support of apartheid sport. Brutus made a short but influential tour.\(^{40}\)

The Resha and Brutus tours were significant: they ended isolation, focused on action and gave direct contact with the liberation struggle. On Resha’s death, SADAF told IDAF that his visit, ‘the first by a Black South African, left a lasting impression’. The tours not only mobilised the movement, they also were of inestimable value ‘in correcting the disgraceful fallacy’ of racist notions about Africans in Australia. In October 1969 another important visitor, Judith Todd, (whose father, former prime minister of Rhodesia, was born in New Zealand) spoke at the Southern Africa Action Conference in Sydney, where a teach-in brought together speakers to plan against sports tours projected for 1970/1.\(^{41}\)

In New Zealand, Trevor Richards heard Brutus speak and decided to march on Sharpeville Day. In July 1970, Richards was elected inaugural national chairperson (a post he held until 1979) of Halt All Racist Tours (HART). Richards became HART’s driving force. As international vice president of the NZ University Students’ Association, he argued for a focus on South Africa and for a specific organisation to coordinate action against tours. HART, seen as an umbrella organisation, was to lead the movement for the next two decades and became synonymous with anti-racism. By now, there was considerable overlap


\(^{39}\) Richards, *Dancing on Our Bones*, 43-5; Chapple, 1981: *The Tour*, 6-12; Newnham interview.

\(^{40}\) Brutus interview; Tatz interview; *‘Sport & Apartheid,’* *Current Affairs Bulletin*, 46/12 November 1970; ‘Dennis Brutus in Australia*, *Africa Newsletter* 2 1969, 5-6, FOA box 2/4.

between organisations, but international connections had been made. Newnham was often on the phone to Brutus, or M.N. Pather in South Africa and keeping ‘one step ahead of Danie Craven’.42

Brutus made a second visit to New Zealand (and Australia) in April 1970. Meeting with Richards, they agreed the movement had to do something to impact public opinion: activists painted slogans simultaneously in a number of cities. Brutus feels ‘the sport issue was of greater significance than people conceived in making that crack in the whole apartheid structure; you were demonstrating international rejection’. Soon that crack was to widen appreciably.43

The 1970s: Springboks, Soweto and sanctions

Increasing state interference in sport inside South Africa had an impact on the global anti-apartheid movement. The UN General Assembly in 1968 urged boycotts of sport contacts. Largescale, vigorous anti-apartheid demonstrations swept Britain in 1969/70, setting the scene for momentous events in Australia in 1971, and New Zealand in 1981. ‘Springbok’ teams faced mass protests that mobilised many and educated a new generation in taking a stand against racism.

In Sydney in 1969/70 there were demonstrations against apartheid politicians, all-white netballers, surf lifesavers, tennis players and golfer Gary Player. A turning point was the June 1969 visit of South African trade minister Haak. Four hundred people gathered in Australia Square and marched, disrupting traffic. A militant group of 200 tried to force their way into Haak’s hotel. The Black Sash also protested, there were demonstrations in Brisbane and Melbourne, and Haak’s offer of South African investment in an alumina plant on Aboriginal land brought an angry reply by Labor parliamentarian Gordon Bryant. To organise all these protests better, the Anti-Apartheid Movement (A-AM) emerged.44

Sydney protest leaders formed a formidable team. Peter McGregor, a teacher, ‘became involved through meeting some South African exiles, especially John and Margaret Brink’. He represented SADAF, seen as broad based to reach moderates. John Myrtle, also a teacher, headed the Campaign against Racism in Sport (CARIS), formed in 1969 after Brutus ‘convinced us we should set up a group to focus on the sports boycott’. In 1969 CARIS presented petitions to rugby and cricket officials of 2 725 and 6 000 signatures respectively against racist tours. These organisations were small, but protests in 1970 led to contact with radical students, represented by Meredith Burgmann, left wing unions, and also the Communist Party, represented by Denis Freney.45

[42 Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, 43-4; Richards, T. and K. Newnham interviews; Chapple, 1981: The Tour, 11.
43 Brutus interview; FOA minutes 12 May 1970.
McGregor, Burgmann, and Freney as A-AM coordinators developed a flexible structure. A demonstration in 1970 at a swimming competition to send Australians to South Africa saw A-AM and CARIS protest outside, while inside, radical students threw black dye into the pool, forcing its abandonment. The groups linked up and protests snowballed in 1970/1 against tennis and basketball tours, and a major protest of 600 against lifesavers. The protests gained good media coverage, but faced physical attacks by uniformed Nazis. By 1971, tens of thousands were marching across Australia.46

The 1971 rugby tour of Australia

The 1971 South African rugby tour faced concerted non-violent resistance. The monolithic wall of silence among sportspersons evaporated as top Australian players spoke out publicly against the tour. Jim Boyce had toured South Africa in 1963, witnessing police brutality and now became SADAF treasurer. James Roxborough and Paul Darveniza had seen the misery of apartheid during their 1968 Wallabies tour and Antony Abraham, Paul Darvenisa, Barry McDonald and Terry Foreman supported them. Union action by transport and hotel workers denied the emissaries of apartheid convenient travel and accommodation and, as federal and some state governments moved to vigorously support the tour, the hypocrisy of ‘no politics in sport’ became increasingly evident as governments adopted tactics of police brutality akin to those of the apartheid regime.47

The tour ignited protests. On 26 June, nationwide demonstrations occurred. SADAF’s polite petitioning gave way to direct action: ‘We must learn from the successful British Stop the Seventy Tour movement … One reason for its success was the flexibility and action oriented nature.’ SADAF conceded that protest had ‘entered a new phase’. The tempo rose with visits of overseas activists. US Bishop Edward Crowther made a lively nine day visit in March. Initially the media ignored his sermons, but in Melbourne the Australian Union of Students secured extensive media coverage and a rousing reception from students. In Canberra, he held a successful meeting with Labor MPs. In Sydney, Crowther spoke to an overflow meeting organised by CARIS. He was invited back in June to join Peter Hain and Trevor Richards in supporting tour protests.48

From their arrival, the South Africans faced vigorous protests. Labour Party leader Gough Whitlam, state ALP premiers Don Dunstan and John Tonkin, and ACTU leader Bob Hawke spoke firmly against the tour. Hawke maintained tight union bans and the ACTU stance helped popularise protests. The WWF went on strike. In the face of concerted bans by transport and hotel unions, the South Africans had to be ferried by private companies. Canberra offered the Air Force.49

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46 Burgmann and McGregor interviews; Freney, A Map of Days, 286-91.
In Perth, protestors got inside the field. In Adelaide they did the same, to face violent police and rugby supporters. Many hundreds ran onto the airport runway. Smoke flares erupted outside rugby functions and on the field. The country was awash with anti-apartheid literature. The A-AM distributed thousands of leaflets and anti-apartheid ‘kits’ with whistles and clickers to ensure the Springboks got little sleep. In Sydney 1 000 protestors turned up at their motel, creating a din so loud Pat Wagner heard it over the radio back in South Africa. Reverend Richard Wooton of Melbourne, leading a delegation to South Africa, recalls ‘we spent our time counting the scores of anti-Springbok demonstrators, particularly those who were arrested’. Ordinary people became involved. In Paddington, worker John Phillips and Builders’ Labourers Federation president Bob Pringle walked into a sports ground behind the Springboks and audaciously sawed through the goalposts with hacksaws. The tour was a watershed. The large scale of protests and the violence of government showed that apartheid was now a major issue.50

More than 700 demonstrators were arrested, many more injured by police. In Melbourne, 5 000 marched in the face of police batons and charging horses described by Hain as ‘legalised thuggery’. In Sydney, leaders such as Burgmann were continually targeted. She was arrested a dozen times but, sporting a wig and false Afrikaans accent, succeeded not just in entering the ground for the Sydney test but also, with sister Verity, in penetrating police defences and even capturing the ball – Verity’s kick was dubbed the best of the year!51

Liberation movement supporters from the frontline states played an important part in events, notably Sekai Holland. Daughter of M.M. Hove, first African MP in what is now Zimbabwe, she came to Australia in the mid 1960s. In 1971 she flew from state to state to address rallies in advance of the rugby. To McGregor, ‘she was in everything’; to Burgmann, she was ‘crucial’. As Freney writes, dressed in bright African garb, she ‘brought new life’ into the movement with her enthusiasm and dedication to liberation struggles. She and white husband Jim checked into the same Sydney motel as the Springboks; below, protestors cheered each time they appeared at the window.52

In Brisbane, Lilla Watson and other Aboriginal activists protested; many were arrested. Aboriginal protests merged with tour actions. For many years indigenous peoples had faced racism, but by 1971 were coming together. When Sekai Holland came to Brisbane and talked with indigenous peoples they ‘took her in; she was just one of us’. In Queensland the AAM faced a true bedfellow of apartheid. Far-right premier Bjelke-Peterson declared a state of emergency. But this ‘galvanised people’ and a general strike ensued. Several thousand protestors chanted ‘The whole world’s watching’ as police brutally charged the crowd. Colin Tatz noted the razor wire, gas

51 S. Harris, Political Football, 81-85; Bastomsky and Burgmann interviews.
masks, dogs, air force— and that no true democracy ever declared a state of emergency over a game. Aboriginal poet Kevin Gilbert captured the irony: ‘Australia, despite a common Aboriginal jibe, is not a down-under South Africa … with the exception of Queensland.’ Aboriginal writer Roberta Sykes added, ‘blacks in Australia do not live under South Africa-like conditions. But the blacks in Queensland definitely do.’

The evils of racism were apparent throughout the tour. Aboriginal leader Charles Perkins, merely watching a Canberra match, was spotted by rugby supporters who hurled racist insults. Historian Manning Clark observed that conservatives ‘wanted not just to preserve Australia for the white man, but accepted a world in which the white men were rich and the coloured men poor’.

In Sydney, there was close interaction between A-AM and Aboriginal Black Power, which under police pressure had moved their base to Bondi Junction, by coincidence close to the Springboks’ motel. When Jim Boyce lent Springbok jerseys to Black Power activists Gary Foley and Billy Craigie, police assumed robbery, arrested and paraded them in front of Springboks, unintentionally breaching security and forcing the players – outraged that black Australians were wearing a symbol of white South Africa – out of their cocoon of indifference. Foley makes a strong connection between protests and the rise of Black Power, whose activists such as Paul Coe and Foley in Redfern and Denis Walker in Brisbane mobilised Aboriginal people against the tour. A central issue became consistent solidarity. During an anti-war rally in Sydney, Coe had challenged white people to support not only overseas causes but their own indigenous people. When confronted with the same challenge, many A-AM activists joined in solidarity with Aboriginal people. Thus, a major impact of the tour was heightened support for Aboriginal rights. In January 1972, Black Power activists confronted Aboriginal tennis star Evonne Goolagong for playing in South Africa. Many A-AM activists participated in a December 1971 black rights rally and supported the 1972 Aboriginal ‘Tent Embassy’ outside Parliament House.

In explaining the large numbers protesting, Burgmann points to several factors: the hard work of CARIS, invaluable in getting footballers involved, and the involvement of unions and churches. Media attacks, if negative, raised the whole question of apartheid. Ongoing anti-Vietnam War protests ‘meant the people were used to the idea of taking their views to the street’. Significant also was the role of Sekai Holland and Aboriginal activists: ‘it was exactly the right time for them, they had become radicalised’. McGregor stresses that the A-AM was more organised, protests received good publicity, and the seven Wallabies ‘gave our campaign moral standing’. There also was frustration by anti-Vietnam War protestors restricted to marching who now found an arena for direct action.

56 Burgmann, McGregor interviews.
The rugby proceeded under armed guard, but the main target was a proposed 1972 cricket tour. In the 1950s, Menzies had declared cricket contact with South Africa ‘precious’ and Australia supported South Africa in the international cricket circuit. The 1971 protests, however, made Australians ‘question the biased, pro-South African reporting’. After the rugby tour, an extensive correspondence between the A-AM and Australian Cricket Board chair Donald Bradman began. Bradman was concerned at cricket’s vulnerability to protests. McGregor told Bradman he was ‘greatly disappointed’ to receive from him Pretoria’s propaganda and sent him instead SAN-ROC policies. Under pressure from churches, unions and public figures, and with opposition from ALP members of the Cricket Board, Bradman not only cancelled the tour, but also stated that Australia would not play with apartheid; adopting anti-apartheid movement policy was a great moral victory.57

**The emergence of national anti-apartheid organisations**

The very success of protests ironically contributed to the movement’s dissipation; its diffuse, spontaneous nature was both strength and weakness. Burgmann argues that, unlike New Zealand with a central body, in Australia ‘tactics had to be different, even in each state. Those days the distance was a major factor’. After 1971, the dispersed and loosely organised movements lost momentum. With future tours effectively cancelled, many activists turned to help Aboriginal struggles. McGregor realised that the A-AM had largely ‘wound down’ with a ‘lack of comprehensive, coherent radical strategy, internal divisions’ and inadequate ‘attention to building our alternatives’.58

SADAF remained a small, somewhat elitist lobby group, but continued to do valuable work. It kept money trickling to IDAF: about A$1 000 a year in the early 1970s. Kader Asmal encouraged it to keep on lobbying government to support the UN Trust Fund. Contacts widened: in 1972 SADAF wrote to SWAPO and in 1974 SADAF secretary Hans Bandler and his wife, Aboriginal leader Faith Bandler, visited Lusaka. There were tours by ZANU leaders Herbert Chitepo and Eddison Zvobgo in 1973, and Zimbabwean Bishop Lamont, though a visit of ANC youth leader Thami Mhlambiso was aborted owing to costs.59

Other Sydney groups did not survive. CARIS and A-AM merged into the Southern African Liberation Centre (SALC), established in 1973. SALC initiated a ‘No Ties with Apartheid’ campaign as the movement now focused on economic sanctions. There were boycotts of fish and Woolworths. Workers at IXL were asked to monitor its use of South African beans. SALC pointed to Canberra’s ‘long silence’

58 Burgmann interview; TR99-278-06: McGregor to Richards, 19 June 1972; McGregor in Cahill, Turbulent Decade, 63.
over the Soweto massacres. Politics was never far away. SALC moved closer to the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), partly because of the ZANU presence. In 1973 SALC attacked IDAF and SADAF, and later the Council of Churches (ACC), over its exclusion of the PAC from its funding.\(^6^0\)

In Melbourne SAP dissolved in 1972, but a new body, the Association against Racial Discrimination (AARD) in Southern Africa, led by Joan Maclagan, emerged the next year. Activities of individuals and small groups became important. Melbourne clergyman Richard Wooton made good of the film *Last Grave at Dimbaza*, sending it around Australia with matching texts to help people explain apartheid. SADAF’s copy also was in constant use by schools, unions, political groups and churches. The film made it to Lismore, Perth, Katherine, even Papua New Guinea.\(^6^1\)

If the years immediately after 1971 saw temporary decline in Australia, then the opposite was true of New Zealand. HART set down real roots, forming branches not only in cities, but also in many regional towns. Interactions continued across the Tasman. When a rugby tour seemed imminent in New Zealand in 1973, Peter McGregor, together with Trevor Richards, campaigned up and down the North and South Islands. There was a cross fertilisation of ideas.\(^6^2\)

Apartheid remained a hot issue. Tom Newnham protested the Holyoake government’s sale of military usable aircraft to Pretoria in 1970, but sporting tours again dominated. Vorster’s cosmetic changes gave NZRFU an excuse to support a 1970 tour of South Africa. Public opinion sharply divided: the media and state funded Maori Council supported a tour, but opposition came from anti-apartheid groups, unions, churches, and Maori politicians. There were vigorous demonstrations. The tour widened to include other citadels of white supremacy: Rhodesia and Namibia. But from elsewhere in Africa new solidarity came: the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa (SCSA) condemned New Zealand, jeopardising the 1974 Christchurch Commonwealth Games. The movement was still ‘uncoordinated and lacking fulltime professional organisation’, yet commanded ‘widespread support’. Greater support and professionalism was soon to develop under the impact of external and internal forces.\(^6^3\)

One of the few South African ANC supporters in New Zealand at this time was Terry Bell, who arrived in January 1971 from Zambia, encouraged by Oliver Tambo and Jack Simons who encouraged Bell to file regular reports via Delhi, though he never received a response. Isolation Down Under also affected PAC activists such as Henry Isaacs, based in Wellington. Active in NUSAS and in 1973 SASO

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president, he went into exile in Swaziland and thence to New Zealand. Bell feels Isaacs lacked real contact with PAC leaders. There were ‘a great many factions and ideological schisms’, with differences ‘more acute in Wellington, mainly on the basis of perceived militancy versus perceived passivity’, but activists were ‘united in opposing apartheid tours’. Isolation did encourage a degree of unity: Bell and Isaacs ‘had no problem sharing platforms’. When isolation invariably led locals to request a senior ANC spokesperson, Bell contacted London directly and arranged a tour by Frene Ginwala.64

Ginwala’s visit in March 1972, together with Bell’s work, laid a base for ANC support. It came ‘at a really critical time and made an extremely important contribution’ (Richards). Kiwi internationalism struck Ginwala. Her visit came as African pressure arose to cancel a Springbok tour. She addressed a conference to ‘Examine New Zealand’s Relationship with Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa’ that attracted 500 people. Resolutions focused on support for liberation movements and a permanent anti-apartheid centre. Prime time TV coverage of Ginwala’s speech suggested ‘the ANC had suddenly become a factor overnight and by morning requests were pouring in from all over the country for visits and meetings’: her hasty ad hoc visit was transformed into an extensive tour.65

Ginwala spoke at many AAM, union and Maori meetings. She saw the effect of colonialism on the Maori Council, but also a challenge by activists who gave her ‘the traditional welcome and express[ed] their solidarity’. Their spontaneous appeal raised NZ$200 for the ANC. Pat Hohepa facilitated a hui (meeting) at the traditional marae (meeting ground) attended by elders, yet it was clear some Maori rugby clubs and factory workers favoured the tour. Unions had a proud record of anti-apartheid resolutions, but Ginwala noted that ‘hitherto we have never asked them to deliver’. Her visit raised union consciousness. She addressed workers at freezing plants in Christchurch, at a Sharpeville Day workers’ meeting in Wellington, at factory canteens and stop-work meetings of the Drivers’ Union in Palmerston North and Dunedin Railway Workshop and met with the Federation of Labour (FOL) and Wellington and Auckland trades councils. Ginwala saw Maori and Labour as the ‘crucial factor’, musing to Alfred Nzo that with ‘concentrated effort’ New Zealand might develop like Scandinavia.66

Ginwala later spent three days in Australia. Another important visitor quickly followed, SACTU general secretary John Gaetsewe, who made an extensive tour in March 1973 at the invitation of the Wellington Trades Council and May Day Committee. He addressed the FOL conference and many factory meetings across the country. In Wellington a deft telephone hook up let 4 000 supporters hear his address. Some 50 000 leaflets were distributed. One result of the tour was material and political support by the Wellington Waterside Workers and Seamen’s Union.

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Gaetsewe went on to Australia to meet unions, during which time the WWF tied up South African ships until the owners raised wages of African seamen from R60 to R220 a month.67

By this time the New Zealand AAM had matured. One measure of its growing seriousness was the training camps for demonstrators, who designed protective shields and rehearsed non-violent disruption tactics. Another was its creativeness: when in 1971 a South African lifesaving team toured, the media flashed around the world the apt placard of protestors: ‘South African Surf Brings Out the Team All White’. Over the next decade, such protests would not go unchallenged, by either the state or pro-tour groups, including Friends of South Africa Association, Aid Rhodesia Movement and vigilantes. The movement developed independence. It was, argues Bell, ‘perhaps the only country where the AAM was a truly national and popular movement not under the direct influence or control of any element of the liberation movement’ and ‘therefore able to adapt’ to develop a boycott policy that saw the ANC as the leading, but one of many, forces fighting apartheid. HART contacted non-racist sports bodies such as the South African Rugby Union, thereby identifying HART as anti-racist, but not anti-sport, which helped win over players such as Chris Laidlaw and Bob Burgess, who spoke on HART platforms. HART ‘was a grassroots anti-racist front’.68

The movement’s international profile grew important in geographically isolated New Zealand. International ties ‘gave the movement credibility’. Richards had begun to develop these ties as international affairs officer of the NZ University Students Association in the late 1960s when ‘he went everywhere across the country’. CARE also developed ties, in 1973 inviting Oliver Tambo to tour. But it was Richards who most broke down isolation. When in 1972 HART and CARE were invited to speak before the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, Wellington, previously ‘quite negative’ about them, took note. HART recognised the importance of an international strategy. After cancellation of a 1973 rugby tour, members went to Lusaka and Dar es Salaam to meet the liberation movements: ironically in the mistaken belief that the struggle against apartheid sport was over. Longterm relationships were forged with Tanzanian and Nigerian governments, the OAU Liberation Committee, and the SCSA. Chris Laidlaw, working for the Commonwealth Secretariat, helped build bridges. When in the late 1970s the Muldoon administration ‘dug itself deeper and deeper into a hole, the international community had a choice of what the AAM was telling them about the policies of the NZ government’. Richards extended the discourse into the lion’s den: in correspondence with Danie Craven over a projected tour, Craven claimed demonstrations would have no effect, but Richards urged Craven, if he was sincere about change, to cancel the tour.69

HART and a new body, the National Anti-Apartheid Coordinating Committee (NAACC, later NAAC) developed extensive publicity material. The South African consulate general, established in 1962, was active with its own. The AAM exposed the propaganda role of Consul Peter Philip from 1969 onwards in education, armed forces, churches, and business. Exploiting the ‘Myth of the Empty Land’ and apartheid’s racist Bantustan theory, Philip gave 97 talks on apartheid in just the first eight months of 1971. In one, he objected to being governed by black people ‘because they are alien’.70

By 1973, there was something of a breakthrough: Labour was in power in both nations. Whitlam’s Labor government (1972–75) adopted some central goals of the anti-apartheid movement. He quickly closed the Rhodesian Information Office, banned racially selected teams and tightened sanctions. Two conflicting tendencies, argues David Goldsworthy, influenced state policy and public attitudes to South Africa at the time: national–economic interests and humanitarianism, both seen under Whitlam. Australia discouraged sports tours, ceased representing Pretoria in the IMF, and gave humanitarian aid, if very limited, to the ANC. Bilateral trade, however, increased. Yet Whitlam’s decision to let humanitarian principles override the legal precept of non-interference in domestic jurisdiction created an important precedent.71

There was ambiguity in ALP policy. In 1973, SADAF successfully lobbied the new government to monitor the trial in South Africa of Alex Moumbaris, an Australian citizen detained in 1972 under the Terrorism Act. A measure of political change in Canberra also was apparent in a January 1973 request from Foreign Affairs for SADAF to supply it with information on apartheid. But economic expediency prevented more consistent state action. In October, Whitlam rejected a plea from Canon Collins to fund SADAF, if expressing personal support. He rejected trade sanctions on the basis they would not work, an argument to become a common refrain of government. Brink expressed alarm at the ‘phenomenal growth’ of Australian exports. SADAF took a closer interest in economic sanctions. By now it was receiving more donations from unions, with whom it sought to cooperate in listing Australian companies in South Africa.72

After Whitlam’s controversial dismissal in 1975, some expected Australian policy on apartheid to revert to traditional Liberal Party conservatism, but Malcolm Fraser (1975–83) continued broad anti-apartheid policy contours. He recalls that some Liberal rednecks ‘supported the Boers’. In 1977, Minister Senator Sheil described Ian Smith as ‘one of the great men of history’. In 1982, the WA Liberal Party called for increased defence co-operation. But Fraser maintained sports sanctions and cancelled a 1979 Wallabies tour. ‘I didn’t like people who didn’t support Gleneagles, but by and large I think most [in cabinet] did’. Fraser’s support for the 1977 Commonwealth

70 Newnham, Apartheid is Not a Game, 5, 11; Fight Apartheid; NZ Listener, 22 March 1971.
Heads of Government (CHOGM) Statement on Apartheid in Sport (Gleneagles Agreement) became firm policy. Yet return to conservative rule saw commercial and diplomatic ties continued, even encouraged; white migration increased; and minimal aid to liberation movements axed. The Uniting Church congratulated Fraser on his public stance but pointed to continuing high levels of investment in South Africa. Not only principle, but also fear of Soviet gains drove Fraser’s policy. His government did not allow liberation movement representation. Nevertheless, Fraser’s broad opposition to white supremacy, seen also in his diplomatic role in Zimbabwe, encouraged greater Australian involvement in southern Africa.

Australian union solidarity actions continued. The ACTU launched a month of action in July 1976 after the killings in Soweto. The WWF imposed bans on goods. In 1976/7, 1978 and 1979 ships were ‘black-banned’. In March and August 1977 the ANC’s Anthony Mongalo visited. The SUA publicised his call for ‘a strong solidarity movement’. In September 1977 a South African ship was refused services in Sydney as the SUA, WWF and NSW Firemen and Deckhands’ Union demanded answers from the ship (and South African diplomats) to the deaths of Steve Biko and SACTU’s Lawrence Ndzanga. The SUA wrote to SACTU: ‘Seamen in Australia believe the government of South Africa is guilty of a crime against humanity when it treats the original inhabitants of Africa as second class human beings and therefore Australian seamen have waged a guerrilla campaign against shipping trade with South Africa’.

The liberation movements still lacked permanent representatives. However, the PAC made ground in Sydney, with SALC and SADAF offering support. Henry Isaacs in New Zealand acted as de facto representative. Representing the Southern African Students’ Movement, he made a three week tour of nine Australian cities in August 1976, sponsored by CARE and the Australian Union of Students. He described Australian media reporting of the Soweto Uprising as ‘appalling’: its political nature was ignored. Rhodesian attacks on unarmed refugees in Mozambique were depicted as a ‘daring Commando raid’. The Soweto Revolt was seen very differently by Bruce Haigh, Australian diplomat in South Africa, who befriended Steve Biko and Donald Woods (assisting the latter to flee South Africa) and visited political prisoners. In Australia, Isaacs met with students, unionists, South Australian premier Dunstan and Aboriginal people: a meeting at Cherbourg ‘Reserve’, Queensland, shocked him: it was ‘the nearest to South Africa that I have seen since leaving South Africa’. The PAC’s Mfanasekaya Gqobose visited for six weeks in 1977, making good contacts that he hoped Isaacs, now appointed PAC representative, could maintain. However, Isaacs soon left Australia, although in 1979, based in Tanzania as the PAC director of education and manpower development, he liaised about material aid with SADAF, who sent money to IDAF for the PAC’s Bagamoyo Centre.

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In different states, groups struggled to develop campaigns, often in isolation. Gradually, unity developed. South African exile Neville Curtis took the initiative with Helen Hill in 1974 to form the first national network: Campaign against Racial Exploitation (CARE), formally launched by ACTU leader Bob Hawke in December 1974. Curtis, a former NUSAS leader who had worked with Biko, fled a banning order as the first South African political refugee accepted by Australia. In 1974 under the aegis of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), he coordinated protests at human rights violations and for sanctions. By 1975 CARE campaigns against Rothmans and Woolworths were in full swing. CARE, like HART, was an umbrella body. It soon affiliated not only anti-apartheid but also Aboriginal land councils, unions, student and peace groups, and created a national newsletter and office. It represented the movement at UN sponsored conferences. Jim and Irene Gale, in Adelaide, became a driving force. Jim, a persuasive speaker, developed the international dimension. The Gales visited Tanzania and the US where they worked with Dennis Brutus. Arriving the day Biko died, they helped set up the Steve Biko Memorial Committee.76

CARE’s national office at first was in Canberra, where in 1976 Curtis received a donation of A$1 800 from SADAF for legal defence of prisoners. By 1977 it had shifted to Sydney where Marion Jacka organised protests against South African cricketers involved in Kerry Packer’s ‘rebel’ cricket series. CARE National Office now swung towards the PAC. The network, though, was much wider. CARE branches formed in most states, including Queensland and Victoria, but it was in South Australia and Western Australia that they put down deep roots and endured, and where strong support for the ANC developed.77

SACARE formed in 1975, absorbing SA Campaign against Racism, and the Movement against Apartheid. It developed a poignant form of protest during Soweto 1976: death notices of victims were placed in newspapers. Pages and pages of African names filled the press. IDAF saw the tactic as a ‘most moving and original’ tribute. They repeated the tactic after new outrages. CARE would ring around constituents to sponsor the notices: often response would be quickest from Aboriginal Land Councils who clearly had a sense of solidarity. This seemed to confirm CARE’s dual track policy of fighting racism abroad and at home. Linda Gale grew up within the movement, with both parents active. CARE Newsletter was produced in the family home, so she became involved in editorial work and in 1979 helped establish Adelaide University CARE., which won a large campaign against South African fish at the university cafeteria. To Linda, the ability to speak to South Africans made the movement real. And South Australia had a talented group of South African émigrés.78


77 WACARE Papers: M. Jacka to G. Pollock, 10 November 1977; Hakika (SALC) 4 [1977?].

Vernon and Rosa Hoffman and Sybil and Edgar Wakefield formed a solid core of activists. Sybil was politicised in District Six. She and Edgar arrived in Sydney in 1971, meeting Vernon, also from District Six where he had been SRC chairperson at Trafalgar High. Moving to Adelaide, the Wakefields came to know the Gales and became involved in SACARE, but at this stage it was difficult to get other South Africans involved as many had emigrated to escape politics. Other active exiles included Basil and Shirley Moore, Colin Collins, Jeremy Hurley and Algernon van der Hoeven. Catholic priest Collins and Methodist minister Basil Moore had worked with Biko in the University Christian Movement, which they founded in 1967. Under pressure, they relocated to Australia. When Biko was murdered, Collins spoke out eloquently in the media. Richard Chance of the Anglican Church also was active. SACARE had a powerful ally in ALP premier Dunstan. The ALP and small left parties (CPA and SPA) always supported the AAM; in contrast, the Liberal Party was ‘awful’.79

In Western Australia, in the 1960s a SADAF group had formed. A short lived Anti-Apartheid Movement emerged in 1971. In the 1970s, heightened white immigration from southern Africa brought concern at the local impact. The Liberal Party premier Charles Court supported white regimes. But exiles also resided in the West. Les Stone grew up in District Six with ANC writer Alex la Guma. South African Coloured People’s Congress national treasurer for ten years and executive member of the Cape Congress Alliance Consultative Committee, harassment induced Stone to migrate to Perth in 1969 where he worked as a teacher and was active in anti-apartheid, peace, and socialist movements. In 1972, he made an anti-apartheid tour to Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, and Auckland. Stone joined Judy Forsyth in a branch of SADAF and then the South African Food and Education Fund (SAFEF), formed in 1972, changing its name to give it freedom to send aid direct to South Africa. SAFEF worked with SADAF on a ‘Don’t Buy SA Products’ campaign as Perth supermarkets reported that their South African goods came from Sydney.80

Paul Kaplan, a draft resister under Ian Smith, and his partner Lesley Corbett left Rhodesia determined to do something about apartheid. Sensitive to racism that he abhorred and from a family with a history of struggle (an uncle was a SACP member), in March 1975 Kaplan found Perth a ‘racist outpost’. Within weeks, Kaplan and Corbett were active in indigenous rights groups that prompted ideas for anti-apartheid work. Sekai Holland’s visit in 1975 inspired them to form the Free Zimbabwe Group, assisted by David Parker (later WA deputy premier). Holland, however, was aligned with Herbert Chitepo, assassinated that year, and was ousted and replaced by Simbarashe Mumbengegwi as ZANU representative. The group was miniscule and soon merged with WACARE.81

WACARE’s roots lay in the need to galvanise the 1971 coalition. After Curtis came to Perth on an ACTU sponsored tour to form a national body, a branch formed in 1975 around Stone, Kaplan, Corbett and communist lawyer Betsy Buchanan. WACARE grew steadily. In June 1976 it protested police killings and demanded Canberra ‘cut all links with apartheid’, tying repression to boycotts via weekly pickets of supermarkets selling South African goods. WACARE built a loose coalition among unions, student, women’s and indigenous bodies, churches and Left parties. It avoided ideological tensions apparent in Sydney. Stone, as an ANC activist, objected to the pro-PAC position of Sydney groups, but had no problems with CARE’s dual track approach to racism.

WA’s enormous mining resources created a potential flashpoint between the state and indigenous people over land and there were close ties with South African mining companies and the Chamber of Mines, which WACARE exposed. In 1978 it exposed mineworker conditions in South Africa and tied this to growing exploitation of minerals in WA’s Kimberley region by transnational Conzinc Rio Tinto. WACARE made detailed submissions to government bodies, calling for total sanctions, aid for the frontline states, and acceptance of refugees from southern Africa and rejection of immigration by racists.

In Melbourne, South African émigrés began to get together in 1977 under the initiative of Jeanne Daly, in 1979 constituting Community Aid Abroad (Southern Africa) (CAASA). Daly had been a teacher in Johannesburg where she regularly visited Denis Goldberg in prison. Important focuses of CAASA’s work were letter writing and fund raising campaigns for political prisoners such as Goldberg and Zephania Mothopeng. Basil Weaich had worked on the Durban docks as a shop steward and, as an ANC member had been arrest in 1960 for sabotage. He escaped to Botswana and came to Australia with wife Amy. David Phillips, a Progressive Party member in the 1960s, studied in Oxford where he befriended future foreign minister Gareth Evans and came to teach at the University of Melbourne. In 1974, he recalls, AAM organisation in Melbourne was still small.

Tim Bruwer, from an Afrikaner family, was a librarian in Cape Town who, rebelling against apartheid, in 1974 came to Australia, where he was able to read banned books by Luthuli, Mandela, Biko, and Braam Fischer. In 1978, he joined the anti-apartheid group. Bruwer took over correspondence started by Daly with Goldberg and wrote to Mamphela Ramphele who was banished to Tzaneen. CAASA helped raise funds via the South African Council of Churches for her community projects. These efforts continued during Bruwer’s three years in Papua New Guinea, where he organised anti-apartheid ‘walkathons’.

In New Zealand, parallel growth occurred. Labour under Norman Kirk (Prime Minister December 1972–August 1974) lacked a comprehensively anti-apartheid

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82 Kaplan, Corbett interviews.
policy but, under pressure, acted. Public support for contact with Pretoria persisted, seen in a Napier pro-tour rally of 2,000 but the movement kept up the pressure: the National Council of Churches (NCC) called for disinvestment; CARE lobbied sporting bodies and politicians; HART’s Trevor Richards traversed the country; and an ultra radical Anti-Tour Action Committee burnt a stadium. By 1973, CARE and HART embraced non-violent resistance. There were signs of co-operation between Maori and the movement. Pressure induced Labour action: a contribution of NZ$5,000 to the UN Trust Fund for victims of apartheid, later boosted to $17,000 and $26,000, with government agreement to distribute UN anti-apartheid literature. In 1973, a White Paper concluded that apartheid ‘was diametrically opposed to New Zealand policy and practice of racial equality’ and in April 1973 Kirk announced a tour would be ‘postponed until the South African team was chosen on a basis of genuine merit’. Among Robben Island prisoners there was ‘pandemonium of joy’.

Kirk, like Whitlam, supported strong action against Rhodesia, declaring ‘we totally reject all doctrines of racial superiority’. He invited Julius Nyerere to visit in March 1974, the first African head of state to do so. Kirk agreed to donate NZ$150,000 via UNICEF for Angolan and Namibian refugees. His government had a new approach; three cabinet ministers were CARE members. Pretoria’s Consul, treated as a virtual ambassador by the Nationals, was now restricted to speaking to civil servants. Yet like Canberra, Wellington refused to stop trade, which continued to slowly grow (though preferences were ended), or directly support liberation movements. Prime ministers of the period, even of anti-apartheid inclination, knew apartheid was a minority issue in terms of elections.

Failure to address trade sanctions was challenged. The National Anti-Apartheid Committee (NAAC) issued pamphlets on economic ties. One aimed at unions highlighted apartheid’s cheap labour and listed New Zealand companies in South Africa that assisted the administration of pass laws, paid their workers very low wages, and invested in state bonds. Trade was not large, but growing.

Anti-apartheid groups increasingly addressed local racism. CARE challenged racist immigration policy towards Pacific Islanders, maintained an office to receive their complaints, and kept inner city schools stocked with anti-racist books. In 1976 HART resolved to ‘involve ourselves in the battle against racism’. Developers were abrogating Maori treaty rights to land; anti-Maori racism was on the rise. Maori grassroots leaders such as Tama Poata, Ripeka Evans and Donna Awatere, who all took strong stands against apartheid, urged the AAM to confront local racism.


87 HART Papers: DFA to Richards, 2 October 1974; Dominion, 28 May 1974; Sorrenson, ‘Uneasy Bedfellows’: he heard the consul declare New Zealand’s racial problems ‘could require a South African “solution”;’ Newnham interview.

relationship, as Maori writer Tracy McIntosh observes, was not without tension, but a ‘close working relationship was forged’ that would culminate in an informal united front against the 1981 tour. These trends were to intensify under the Muldoon government.89

In 1975 the National Party’s Robert Muldoon won the election on a programme including support for South African tours. HART mobilised strongly against a projected 1976 tour. The NCC called on churches to ‘reaffirm their disapproval of apartheid’. By February 1976, Muldoon was deploying strong arm police tactics against protestors. A tempestuous visit by the SCSA’s Abraham Ordia saw him insulted by Muldoon. Black South African weightlifter Precious McKenzie and the PAC’s Henry Isaacs spoke out strongly against the tour.90

The All Blacks tour went ahead at the worst possible time: the Soweto uprising, when many died even before players left. Yet though the All Blacks themselves experienced tear gassing, the NZRFU and NZ Olympic Committee refused to acknowledge the terrible events. Muldoon’s insensitivity raised the prospect of a Montreal Olympics boycott of New Zealand. A strong AAM in Montreal was joined by Dennis Brutus and HART’s Dave Wickham. Brutus sought a compromise, but faced a split in SANROC, where Sam Ramsamy opposed him, and in SCSA, where Jean-Claude Ganga opposed Ordia. The OAU supported Ordia and Brutus, but New Zealand refused their reasonable demands. The OAU held firm and 28 African countries (and Iraq) walked out, representing a significant widening of sanctions to third parties.91

Apartheid sanctions now dominated CHOGM conferences, with Britain and New Zealand in the dock in 1977, 1979 and 1981. Muldoon publicly agreed with the Gleneagles Agreement, but largely ignored it in practice, deriding the UN Special Committee as a ‘group which bases its actions on lies’ and HART actions as ‘bordering on treason’. By 1979, when a citizen’s tribunal awarded Muldoon’s government a ‘D’ for sporting ties and ‘E’ for inaction in the UN International Anti-Apartheid Year, and a visit by Ramsamy brought no change, it was clear the anti-apartheid movement faced major hurdles.92

Appreciating the need for unity, there was a rough division of labour: HART on sporting sanctions; NAAC on economic boycotts, the significance of which increased between tours in 1979–80 and after 1981. South African trade was small: in 1969–70 imports were only NZ$3.9m, exports NZ$3.1m of a total NZ$750m. Yet while New

Zealand had complied with UN sanctions and ceased trade with Rhodesia in 1968, government and businesses ignored the call for sanctions on South Africa and assisted trade through tariffs and support for companies, the Wool Secretariat, and Dairy Board.  

Sanctions campaigns intensified, targeting Rothmans, NZ Insurance and South British Insurance. The Apartheid Information Centre in Auckland issued a trenchant exposé of how these companies controlled a leading South African company from which they drew 5–7 per cent of their income. Many people bought minimum shares and called expensive special meetings, contributing to successful divestment in 1982. Wine and dairy boycotts developed. Expanded campaigns required organisational change; the NAAC was strong in the country, HART in the capital. A controversial merger in 1980 produced a united if still autonomous national body, HART:NZAAM. There was great attention to painstaking work: local branches mushroomed and developed tools such as activist manuals.

As the 1970s drew to an end things looked bleak in South Africa, unpromising in Australasia: Wellington encouraged tours; Canberra took the opposite view, but not vigorously; neither banned trade nor supported liberation movements. Whilst there had been visits from Ginwala, Gaetsewe, and (in 1974) Ruth Mompati, ANC policies were little known. Support of the PAC by HART, CARE (Sydney), SALC and SADAF brought ostracism in international circles. However, Jim and Irene Gale were shifting CARE to support the ANC and lobbying hard for Canberra to tighten sanctions and allow the opening of an ANC office. Before this happened, the largest and the decisive battle over sports sanctions was to be played out on the streets and rugby grounds of New Zealand.

The 1980s: ‘The tour’, sanctions, and the liberation movements arrive

In New Zealand there had been growing opposition to race based tours for two decades. But HART: NZAAM achieved phenomenal success in mobilising mass protests during the July–September 1981 rugby tour that, per capita, were perhaps the largest in the world. ‘The tour’ was apartheid’s Waterloo in Australasia; no major tours followed.
1981: ‘The tour’

HART organised a Stop the Tour conference at Porirua as early as 1979. The first national day of action was held in December 1980. Speaking tours helped fan opposition. South African exile Sylvester Stein opposed South African involvement in the World Veteran Games in Christchurch in January 1981. Andrew Molotsane (SACTU), Henry Isaacs (PAC), and Gillies Kati (SWAPO) all spoke out against the tour. Molotsane was especially dynamic, making ‘a tremendous impact’ as Minto recalls at big marches before the tour. HART got down to business by exposing the Springbok’s Broederbond officials.97

Thus there was widespread opposition even before the tour began. Unlike previous tours, the press was largely opposed. Newnham counted 90 organisations that supported the movement. African leaders bombarded Muldoon with pleas against the tour: Lesotho’s Leabua Jonathan said it would be divisive at CHOGM; Nyerere diplomatically but firmly condemned it. Sports bodies opposed the tour at the Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association meeting. Students from fifteen Christchurch high schools formed School Students against the Tour. Christchurch Cathedral invited Bishop Tutu, but P. W. Botha withdrew his passport. Wellington City Council closed public facilities to the Springboks. Labour leader Rowling lauded HART’s ‘incredible amount of guts’ and pledged support for lawful protests. Muldoon’s deployment of a police state, however, was destined to try to criminalise this mass movement.98

As in Australia in 1971, the scrumming ambassadors of apartheid were given no rest, even before they arrived. Mary Baker a ‘mad keen’ rugby supporter, housewife, and HART Christchurch leader, launched a one person protest up the aisle of the plane bringing the players. Upon arrival, it was constant protest.99

Police reports, if underestimating numbers, show the scale of protest, which was ‘largely peaceful’ but with unprecedented ‘intensity, organisation and determination’. The Air Force ferried 20 903 police in 881 flights and army engineers laid barbed wire. A May Day national march drew 50 000 people, a 3 July mobilisation 48 000. Players were met at the airport by 2 000 protestors. ‘Day of Shame’ marches on 22 July attracted 10 000. In Hamilton, protestors demolished boundary fences, 400 of them (including Tom Newnham, seriously bashed by a rugby crowd calling for his blood) invading the ground as a dive bombing anti-apartheid pilot overhead forced cancellation of the match. Bleary eyed Afrikaners in South Africa stared with amazement at their first ever televised Test. Police arrested pro-tour supporters with shotguns intending to shoot protestors. In Christchurch, union action made player accommodation difficult. In Wellington 1 600 police used batons and barbed wire against 5 000 protestors. Simmering popular opposition to different racisms

merged in Auckland when ‘Maori gang members wielding fence palings, sticks and throwing … volcanic rocks from household walls’ confronted hated police shock squads. There were protests at the Consulate, on airport runways, in rural towns. On 11 September, 10 000 marched in Auckland. The next day a TV relay station in Timaru was occupied, disrupting transmission as 3 000 marched in Christchurch, 3 500 in Wellington and 6 000 in Auckland. A light plane dropped leaflets and flour bombs on players. The Harbour Bridge was blockaded. The tour was over; it saw 205 demonstrations over 57 days in 28 centres involving 150 000 people with 1 944 arrests. State intelligence and government ‘dirty tricks’ targeted movement leaders; many journalists were refused accreditation. But HART had ‘achieved their aim: to illustrate that apartheid should only exist within a repressive environment and a virtual state of emergency’.  

International solidarity grew. The ANC’s Alfred Nzo urged intensified efforts. Messages of support came from Bishop Tutu and the South African Council on Sport. Elsewhere in Africa, protests received wide coverage. The SCSA profoundly thanked HART for making the tour ‘most embarrassing and disgusting’. In London there was a protest outside New Zealand House as angry African diplomats confronted the high commissioner for nine hours. The venue of the Commonwealth Ministers of Finance meeting was moved from New Zealand. When after the tour the Springboks flew to the US, Dennis Brutus and other activists ensured that they played to tiny crowds, protected by police, surrounded by demonstrators. As CHOGM met, HART’s Dave Cuthbert heard African diplomats wonder why New Zealanders, ‘a predominantly white people with a British colonial background, should mount the biggest anti-apartheid struggle ever waged outside South Africa?’ Muldoon’s stance prompted Nyerere’s probing question at CHOGM whether any leaders present faced a situation where their apartheid policy had half their country ‘up in arms’. 101

There are other interesting dimensions. Peter Utting and Jeya Wilson witnessed the South African response firsthand: Bishop Tutu, Smangaliso Mkhathwa and Beyers Naudé told them the tour was an affront. Black people responded to the Hamilton events ‘with absolute jubilation.’ ‘In voices filled with emotion, they told us that they didn’t know that people thousands of miles away cared so much … They had seen blacks and whites linking arms together on that rugby field. They implored us to go home and tell them to intensify the protests.’ Mandela, hearing of the events in prison remarked ‘it felt like the sun coming out’. 102

There were rich and varied experiences. Suburban branches proliferated. The North Wellington Anti-Apartheid Group grew rapidly with strong support from


school and community groups. In rural towns, where ‘rugby was almost a national religion’ there often was hostility. Juanita Doorey marched in Palmerston North before a big police presence as HART megaphones blared ‘Stay united, stay strong’. Yet ironically ‘political solidarity came very much through the rugby connection’. Christchurch, where activists such as Mary Baker, Marion Hobbs, and Robert and Roma Finlay worked around the clock, epitomised changes sparked by the tour. David Small recalls not long before, meetings had been so small people fell asleep in meetings. By August, polls showed 64 per cent of Christchurchians – and a majority nationwide – opposing the tour. A protest in the city saw 126 arrests; initially, Maori gang members heckled the protestors but, after seeing police violence, joined in as chants of ‘2, 4, 6, 8 … Don’t play games with a racist state’ changed to ‘2, 4, 6, 8 … racist tour, police state’.103

Unlike Christchurch, with open structures, Wellington activists organised tightly in Citizens Opposed to the Springbok Tour (COST), an ad hoc group established to counter government smear campaigns against HART. In Auckland, Mobilisation against the Tour (MOST) formed with a Marshal’s Committee in which Workers’ Communist League leaders lent a more militant hue. A survey of protestors indicated participation of many middle class demonstrators, a sizeable proportion of women, a good number of Maori and, where unions had undertaken education, worker participation. Peta Siulepa and Ray Mercer observed that many Maori/Polynesian protestors made connections with their own conditions. Rarotongan Ted Nia saw his people as not very active or informed on apartheid, but this changed and ‘exceeded my expectations’.104

A more organic relationship between anti-racist *Pakeha* and Maori developed. In Auckland, huge protests at Bastion Point in 1977/8 saw *Pakeha* in HART express a solidarity that continued in 1981 when more Maori than ever protested. Donna Awatere’s participation encapsulates the commitment of Maori solidarity. The tour ‘was the most important six weeks of Maori history since the war’ against British invasion. She had given hospitality to black South African exiles and ‘felt part of their struggle because I could see how it related to ours’. At the matches, many Maori protestors were brutally beaten by police. Confronted by the violence of the police Red Squad, Maori formed themselves into the Mandela Squad, chanting ‘Nelson Man-de-la’ and the traditional *haka*. Awatere saw the protests as the start of a new Maori assertiveness.105

The relationship between anti-apartheid *Pakeha* and Maori was cooperative, but not without tension: Awatere felt ostracised by HART. The tour boosted militant

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Maori nationalism as increasingly Maori asked why Pakeha did not support their rights. HART leader Minto sees the movement’s most significant legacy as recognition that people ‘could not be concerned about racism thousands of miles away without being concerned about it in their own country’.106

Another dimension was Trans-Tasman Solidarity; Gary Foley came across with two other Aboriginal activists. They penetrated the field in Hamilton. It was ‘one of the most extraordinary things of my life. We got on the field, helped stop the match. ... We were nearly killed [by spectators] but we had red-black-gold [colours of the Aboriginal flag but also a local rugby team] scarves, [which] probably saved our lives’. It was a continuation of solidarity: Foley, active in 1971 protests, had an earlier association with Syd Jackson and the Polynesian Panthers, and Maori had supported the 1972 Aboriginal Tent Embassy.107

All sections of society were impacted. Women against the Tour were as strident in the face of police brutality as they were eloquent in their anti-apartheid poetry. Students organised speakers at schools and marches. Churches faced divisions, but there was ecumenical unity. Catholic bishops opposed the tour, but at parish level clergy were divided. Nevertheless, as Minto recollects, the churches were ‘solid, with a good analysis, and prepared to stick their necks out in a conservative community’. Canterbury Trades Council helped fund an anti-tour advertisement. HART’s main office was in Trades Hall, given at cheap rent. Unions were ‘the backbone’ of the movement, says Utting, though Minto argues their overall role was largely symbolic: a few dedicated unions like Boilermakers and Seamen gave grassroots support, and ‘the working class people we had there were absolutely rock-solid’ but some other unions were ‘uncomfortable with our civil disobedience’. After the Hamilton protest, a Drivers’ Union leader was confronted by an angry mob of pro-rugby members.108

Mass involvement contributed to changes in organisation and wider society. There was more emphasis on collective participation and principles of non-violence and gender balance. The movement unlocked not only passions, but also the imagination of a people. The Biko Squad and Artists against Apartheid, the bold solo flight of Marx Jones who buzzed the Springboks incessantly, all testified to a determination not to let New Zealand be seen as apartheid’s accomplice. There was much artistic creativity, poetry, street theatre. Maori filmmaker Merata Mita’s documentary Patu (‘Strike’) ‘documented how thousands of everyday New Zealanders ... demonstrated their disgust at apartheid and their dissatisfaction with New Zealand’s race relations’. Newnham summed up: ‘people experienced a sense of having achieved a turning point in the moral history of their country – and had made it visible to the world’.109

107 Foley interview.
What stands out is the violence. In Auckland the final test was on the anniversary of Biko’s death. Militant protestors in the Biko Squad, protected by shields and helmets, faced fierce police force. Artists against Apartheid, who tried to diffuse tensions, and carried a burning rope spelling ‘BIKO’ were bludgeoned, clowns clubbed, a girl dressed as a bumblebee severely beaten, almost paralysed. ‘Orwell’s Grim Spectre Stalks Manawatu’ heralded The Dominion, not missing the irony of South African white people playing behind barbed wire. There had been thousands of arrests, many injuries and complaints against police brutality. Six of the seven jailed were black: one of them, Tigilau Ness, still in prison in 1983, wrote that ‘to hate apartheid and all that it stands for … is not bad’. The tour, concludes Newnham, was ‘forced through by batons and barbed wire’.

Muldoon’s legacy was bitter and divisive. While he proclaimed his ‘opposition’ to the tour sincere, his biographer notes some of his NP colleagues conceded he did little to prevent it. Some New Zealanders, even within HART, see Muldoon less a racist as a cunning politician who used the ‘rugby card’. To Malcolm Fraser, however, he was ‘a spoiler’ in the Commonwealth; ‘if somebody is prepared to use sport in a racist way … then I think that person is racist.’ Thabo Mbeki is of a similar view, ‘Muldoon sought to hide his racist positions behind his liberal rhetoric’; yet ‘even the love of rugby could not stop thousands of New Zealanders from demonstrating in favour of nonracial sport in our country and freedom for the oppressed black millions’.

There were reasons for the intensity of protests. Wide loathing of Muldoon and his divisive tactics, plus years of NP attacks on labour, Maori and social movements fuelled discontent, stoked by ongoing social change that Richards sees as ‘the climax to a complex and powerful set of conflicting pressures and attitudes’. International isolation hurt national pride. The gradual build up of opposition in 1973 and 1976 re-ignited the movement. Greater involvement of Maori and women’s bodies helped build a mass struggle, as did solid organisation and creative tactics. Over the years HART had built support right down to villages. When government demonised HART, new ad hoc groups mobilised fresh people. MOST raised large funds for court expenses. Determined to stop the tour, HART had fulltime workers. Protestors were well prepared, and resolute – in Hamilton ‘we had grappling irons, flares’ says Minto, but ‘we just ripped fences down with our hands’. It ‘became spontaneous action, a genuine people’s movement’. After all, as Newnham puts it, ‘the South Africans were here; you had something to bite on. And they were here for three bloody months!’ Muldoon won the election after the tour, but the AAM had won a bitter war: 1981 was to be the last serious foray of apartheid sport into the region.


The drive to sanctions

Sanctions became the big issue of the 1980s. The return of Labour in both countries saw the consummation of some anti-apartheid movement policies: in Australia, the Hawke and Keating (1983–96) governments and David Lange (1984–89) in New Zealand saw principled opposition to apartheid, but the road to more effective sanctions was neither easy, nor straightforward.

Within the Commonwealth, Hawke took a strong stance, clashing with Britain’s Margaret Thatcher. Gareth Evans (foreign minister 1988–93), an anti-apartheid protestor in student days, actively opposed apartheid. Sanctions intensified in areas, with bans on new investments and loans. Pretoria’s tourism office was closed, a code of conduct produced, and A$22m given to victims of apartheid. Between 1983 and 1987 imports declined by 14 per cent, exports 26 per cent.113

As sanctions tightened, trade became surreptitious. South African yarn labelled ‘Made in Swaziland’ appeared. In 1983, the Australian Workers’ Union detected peanut butter imports. A Tasmanian company imported anthracite. By the end of 1986 Australia still ranked fifth among countries hosting transnational companies involved in South Africa. Rio Tinto Zinc made massive profits from mines in South Africa and Namibia. In 1987, 30 per cent of Australian Mining Industry Council members had strong South African connections: Anglo-American and Stockdale, part of the WA Chamber of Mines, were active in mining exploration and diamond marketing. Individual sportspersons still visited. With government relatively slow to act, the anti-apartheid movement and unions adopted people’s sanctions. Unions forced withdrawal of shipping and South Africa’s Pick ‘n’ Pay supermarkets. Activists boycotted Shell and products such as wine and fish.114

The New Zealand Labour government, if in Lange’s own words playing only a ‘bit player’ role in global arenas, nevertheless carried out a policy of ‘concerted opposition to apartheid’. Lange not only closed the South African Consulate, but also banned new investments, Krugerrand and sale of computers, discouraged state trade missions, tourism and sports tours, terminated reciprocal transport contracts, encouraged a voluntary oil embargo and established New Zealand’s first diplomatic mission in Africa, in Harare. Lange visited Africa and rebuilt a national reputation badly tarnished by Muldoon. However, Lange’s moral suasion did not dissuade business from pursuing trade.115


Economic sanctions became more important. Even in 1981, protestors had attacked companies trading with apartheid: a march in Auckland turned its fury on Lion Breweries and Hughes and Cossar. Now campaigns targeted wines, fruit, dairy products, and insurance. In 1982, HART launched a wine boycott against importer Quill-Humphreys. HART held weekly pickets and by 1984 had enough supporters with shares able to call expensive special meetings. By 1985, success on the wine front transitioned to a campaign against tallow and truck imports. Lange initially restricted imports, which dropped by nearly half in two years, but trade continued. The Dairy Workers’ Union joined the picket against dairy trade. In 1988, there was a sharp 28 per cent increase in trade, and government lifted a ban on ferrochrome imports. HART, backed by CARE, ANC Aotearoa and unions, mounted a major campaign to force Fletcher Challenge to disinvest, successful in 1989. Canterbury Labour Council urged affiliates to report sanction breaches. In 1989, HART demanded Wellington revoke licences of Anglo American controlled Gold Mines New Zealand, engaged in controversial mining on the Coromandel Peninsula. Minto asked ‘How can a Labour government allow a South African multinational company to plunder New Zealand’s natural resources, destroy environmentally sensitive areas and then feed the huge profits back to the benefit of South Africa’s white minority regime?’

Sport sanctions remained a hot topic. HART continued to lobby government and sport bodies on breaches of the UN boycott. Lange’s moral suasion failed to dissuade NZRFU from attempting a tour in 1985, though public opinion against contacts had shifted dramatically from 3 per cent in 1969 to 65 per cent; it was cancelled only after HART succeeded with a High Court injunction. Some players refused to play with apartheid: All Blacks captain Graham Mourie had refused in 1981 when the UN Special Unit on Apartheid began to issue its Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa, featuring Australian golfers, surfers and cricketers who found playing in South Africa lucrative. Greed was evident in 1986 when a New Zealand rebel team organised by Louis Luyt slunk into South Africa. Official contacts were dead but in 1988 SANROC criticised New Zealand for entertaining an English team rejected by India for contact with apartheid.

HART remained in touch with South African nonracial bodies. The UDF’s ‘Terror’ Lekota wrote in March 1985 exposing the cosmetic nature of modifications to apartheid sport: All Blacks would ‘play on pitches … forbidden ground to our people’. In 1988 the UDF’s Arnold Stofile (who had earlier toured New Zealand) wrote to HART from prison in Middledrift, Ciskei, to say how enlightening he found HART’s Amandla. When Stofile’s legal appeal failed and he faced the worst, he urged HART to convey the


message, ‘My friends, you have been good to me and my people. May you continue to be so until the day of our freedom.’ Steve Tshwete, secretary of the ANC 75th Anniversary Committee, acknowledged HART as a ‘dependable and reliable’ ally.\(^{118}\)

It was a similar scenario in Australia. Fraser had banned official teams from South Africa and applied secondary boycotts, a policy maintained, under public pressure, by Labor foreign minister Hayden, who, however, lifted secondary boycotts on a case-by-case basis. Sports tours remained a volatile issue, kept alive by ‘rebel’ tours that ironically helped keep the issue of apartheid before the public eye. As Tatz astutely noted, ‘Australian trade sanctions can’t hurt. But the sports boycott is a strategy of worth; it causes the white elite a great deal of pain.’ Yet it was still necessary to maintain trade sanctions, at home and abroad, and here Canberra played a significant role.\(^{119}\)

In October 1985 the Commonwealth set up the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), initiated by Hawke and led by former prime ministers Fraser and Obasanjo. The EPG made determined efforts to broker change in South Africa. Over six months it met with the regime, black leaders, and the frontline states. In March 1986 the EPG presented a ‘possible negotiating concept’, but by June, despite extensive consultations, concluded that Pretoria had no intention of negotiating; hence sanctions were needed to prevent further violence. In July Fraser, concerned that absence of UK–US support for change would escalate conflict, demolished Thatcher and Reagan’s claims that economic sanctions were ‘immoral’. Fraser’s was an important intervention, but it fell on deaf official ears.\(^{120}\)

Fraser’s involvement signalled a new commitment to action by Australia. Meeting with Foreign Minister Pik Botha, Fraser argued that release of political prisoners and unbanning the liberation movement would stimulate negotiations. Fraser and Obasanjo met with P. W. Botha on 12 March 1986. They were ‘deferential’ so as not to jeopardise the mission but later made clear that Pretoria ‘should not assume we agreed with his analysis’. Fraser met political, church, business and labour leaders. He visited townships and hostels he described as a ‘disgrace to humanity’, noting ‘there is only one other regime in this century as racist as this’. Allan Boesak was glad the EPG had avoided the Homelands, but told Fraser he had had considerable difficulty persuading the UDF to meet them, reminding Fraser that politics in Australia was shaped through open debate, which South Africa lacked. Desmond Tutu warned Fraser that going to Alexandra would be dangerous, but the EPG persisted. Hippo vehicles stopped their car, forcing them to a police station. Winnie Mandela was realistic: the EPG would find too many locked doors, but urged Fraser to exert maximum pressure to release prisoners. Gavin Relly for his part suggested negotiations could take ten years.\(^{121}\)

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In retrospect, Fraser sees the EPG as critical to the ultimate settlement. He injected pragmatism, insisting they had to go without preconditions. But when the EPG offered a guide to negotiations, P. W. Botha was ‘uncompromising’. Yet South Africans who came up to him in the street invariably supported negotiations. He cannot forget the dignity of the imprisoned Mandela who, when they first met, first asked if cricketing legend Sir Donald Bradman was still alive. Beyond humanitarianism, Fraser was arguing for the future of capitalism in South Africa. He tried hard to convince Thatcher and Reagan to see reality; he told Edward Kennedy and the Ford Foundation that increased violence would lead to a ‘totally radical’ government that ‘would nationalise all major corporations. The strategic, economic and commercial interests of the west would be destroyed’. Fraser had allies in the Republican Party, and Congress was in the process of imposing sanctions, but Chester Crocker told Fraser that Washington did not want to isolate South Africa.122

If Fraser well understood what was at stake strategically, the ties between South Africa, Australia, and imperialism were little understood at home. Some Australian left writers exposed nuclear–military connections with Pretoria. Left parties, anti-apartheid groups, and the Australian Peace Committee drew the attention of a growing peace movement to threats posed by Pretoria: its nuclear programme, military destabilisation of frontline states, and bases such as Simon’s Town that could draw the region into global conflict. Canberra supported the UN arms embargo, but evidence suggests that Australian companies were involved in shady arms deals with Pretoria, if of a minor nature.123

In general, sanctions were decisive in dragging Pretoria to negotiations. Australia and New Zealand played a creditable role. Financial sanctions bit hard, sports boycotts added pressure for change. Some lesser diplomats were expelled. By 1988, incoming Ambassador David Tothill (1988–92) felt his government ‘firmly fixed in Australian public demonology’. Yet Canberra long failed to invoke truly effective sanctions and many Australians remained unconvinced of their value. Conservative diplomat Alan Renouf berated Whitlam and Fraser for pursuing without ‘valid ground’ a vigorous role in an area of ‘little consequence for Australia’s national interests’. Such perspectives accorded with trade priorities but fail to explain why other states such as Sweden also took a strong role.124

Sanctions always had their opponents. The persistent propaganda of South Africa’s embassy had an impact on some. There was the sad spectacle of Helen Suzman visiting Australia to denounce sanctions, clashing with Fraser and, clearly piqued by what she saw as the EPG’s failure to accord adequate recognition to her own small, pro-business party, asserting the EPG report was ‘untrue and naïve’. Rogue ALP politician Graeme Campbell also opposed sanctions. But the main opposition

122 Fraser interview; Fraser Papers: Fraser to Kennedy, 12 June 1986, transcript, 5 February 1986.
123 V. Williams, Volcano on Our Doorstep (Perth: Lonehand, 1980); Weekly Mail, 8 November 1991.
to sanctions came from the National Party and sections of the Liberal Party, business, and mass media.\textsuperscript{125}

Only a handful of conservatives, notably Fraser, actively opposed apartheid. Others such as the WA premier Charles Court and James Killen gave ideological succour to Pretoria, as did far right activist B. A. Santamaria. MP Ross Lightfoot stood on the front line with SADF troops in occupied Namibia as a show of solidarity with white supremacy. The Australia–South Africa Association (ASAA) lobbied for close ties in the 1983 election, in 1985 solicited funds from business to smash sanctions, and supported ‘rebel’ teams. Close ties continued with mining companies. The anti-apartheid movement strongly challenged Pretoria’s supporters. In marked contrast, as historian Norman Etherington astutely comments, supporters of apartheid ‘could never get up a pro-apartheid demonstration.’ In this struggle, public opinion was vital and it hardened against Pretoria in the 1980s. Yet many Australians remained ambivalent on sanctions, many seduced by media harping on ‘no politics in sport’, or having similar broad attitudes, captured by journalist John Pilger, when he took a train

to Soweto and saw … the red eyes and yellow teeth, melon bellies and stick legs … Back in Johannesburg and Cape Town, I told the liberal people what I had seen, and they stood around the barbecue and listened respectfully, shaking their heads. They might well have been on the other side of the Indian Ocean. I had glimpsed my own country in theirs.\textsuperscript{126}

Overcoming attitudes such as these was a great challenge, but growing direct contact with South Africans contributed to the push for sanctions.

The liberation movements arrive

The liberation movements paid more attention to Australasia after 1981. HART’s international ties strengthened. Trevor Richards and Yvonne Cuthbert undertook a tour of Africa. In Lusaka, Oliver Tambo told them their 1981 protests gave ‘so much hope and comfort’ and ‘set the standard for other movements’. In Dar es Salaam, they met the PAC’s Joe Mkhwanazi; Maxwell Nemadzivhanani, visiting from Australia, discussed an Oceania representative. OAU Liberation Committee chair Brigadier Mbita and the Tanzanian Olympic Committee were full of praise. Back in New Zealand, liberation movement visits increased. SWAPO’s Sacky Namugongo toured in October 1982. He spoke widely and effectively – once to a crowd outside Mt Eden Prison, still holding 1981 protestors. The tour raised understanding of, and support

\textsuperscript{125} H. Suzman, \textit{In No Uncertain Terms} (New York: Knopf, 1993), 262-3.

for, SWAPO: HART sent NZ$4 391 to SWAPO. Muldoon tried to prevent the money going and in 1983 NP politicians visited South Africa with the blessing of Muldoon, returning to promote apartheid.127

But there was no stopping the spread of liberation movement influence. There were remarkable visitors; not all foreign. Father Michael Lapsley and Canon John Osmers were both New Zealand born Anglican priests who reconciled their pacifism with the struggle, joined the ANC, and lost limbs to deadly letter bombs: Osmers in July 1979 (one hand) and Lapsley (both hands and an eye) in April 1990. Osmers in 1965 settled in Lesotho before being deported. Phyllis Naidoo writes, he ‘gave his home, telephone and meagre food supplies to all of us. His little van carried young refugees around Maseru.’ Lapsley lived in Australia from 1967 to 1973, joining the South Australian Committee against Racism. From 1973 to 1976 he was a chaplain in South Africa before moving to Lesotho, where he worked with Naidoo and Osmers, and then Harare. Lapsley, writes Nelson Mandela, ‘could not remain aloof from the suffering of our people’. Both men regularly returned to New Zealand to condemn apartheid. Such visitors were important to HART as they appealed to an important constituency, the churches. In its early days, church support was significant as many viewed HART as radicals. HART made a point of bringing out visitors from different backgrounds, including the white community. The more people came, the more support HART got and the more the media, initially quite conservative, understood.128

In Australia, the South African embassy became a focus of protests. Canberra is a small city and the formal movement there was not strong. The pro-ANC Luthuli Group, formed in 1982, was a lobby group and facilitated visits by anti-apartheid leaders but it was, notes one of its key figures, Donald Denoon, never a major force. Instead, the PAC gained support as Maxwell Nemadzivhanani established a firm base. Born in Venda in 1956 and mentored by Josiah Madzunya, he was active in the South African Student Movement and went into exile to Botswana in 1977, then in 1978 to Australia where he studied before opening a PAC Office in 1982. Appointed chief representative in 1983, he was backed by SALC and the Southern African Support Campaign (led by Vijay Magan and Neville Legg) in Sydney, and the ACT Trades and Labour Council.129

In 1985 Nemadzivhanani and his Australian wife Kerry Browning formed the Soweto Mobilisation Committee (later Azania Support Group). The PAC’s Johnson Mlambo addressed a protest in June 1985 and Gora Ebrahim came in 1987. PAC

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supporters had a local radio programme, held African cultural events to raise funds, and gained support from student and labour unions and some left parties. On South African Women’s Day 1985, protesters disrupted an address to the National Press Club by Ambassador Cornelius Bastiaanse. Pressure on the embassy came from union embargos, a protest tent and a mobile office. Picketing intensified on Soweto Day 1986; a protestor penetrating embassy grounds to break windows was beaten repeatedly with a stick by attaché Koos Alberts, subsequently expelled. In 1988 police charged Nemadzivhanani and Browning with alleged arson of diplomats’ cars. Charges against Nemadzivhanani, and all but one against Browning, were dropped and suspicious linger of police involvement with South African security forces. Outside Canberra and Sydney PAC presence was weak but pro-ANC Denoon concedes that Nemadzivhanani was ‘very active and hugely effective’; the PAC ‘picked up the most militant of the feminists, radicals gravitated’ to it.¹³⁰

PAC visits to the region continued; PAC Women’s Section leader Maude Jackson visited in October 1986. During his Australian term, Nemadzivhanani was able to increase mobilisation against apartheid and spoke widely in Asia and the Pacific. In February 1990 he left to become PAC representative in Nigeria and in 1991 PAC chief organiser in South Africa. Another prominent (white) PAC activist, Bernard Leeman, came to Australia in 1988, but his political activity had waned after the 1986 death of his comrade P. K. Leballo, though Leeman later sought to help repatriate PAC exiles. In general, PAC influence steadily declined as the ANC’s profile rose in Australia.¹³¹

ANC and SWAPO visitors had politicised perceptions of apartheid, but a permanent presence was needed. CARE took the lead. By 1981, Jim Gale and others succeeded in transforming CARE into a pro-ANC body and the national office shifted to Adelaide. CARE emerged as the effective national centre, with UN Special Committee blessing, representing Australia internationally and active in the Asia–Pacific region, hosting major conferences on Namibia in 1985 and 1989. Its leaders increased pressure on government for an ANC office. Gale, who knew Foreign Minister Hayden through the ALP, bombarded him with pleas. Canberra was suspicious of liberation movements, but lobbying and visits by key ANC leaders, notably Mavis Nhlapo and Andrew Molotsane, swung the case.¹³²

Sonwabo Edwin (Eddie) Funde arrived in Perth on 5 December 1983 and as the ANC’s Chief Representative in Australasia and the Pacific opened a mission in Sydney in January 1984. Born in Soweto and previously head of the ANC Youth Secretariat, he


¹³¹ Sowetan, 16 January 1996; Karis-Gerhart Collection 1964-90, reel 100: biographical data. Elected to Parliament after 1994, Nemadzivhanani was expelled in 2003 and crossed to the ANC. Leeman joined the ANC in Tanzania but was expelled in 1977, joining the PAC. He served in APLA: emails from B. Leeman, 19, 22 May 2006.

¹³² CARE Newsletter, 73, (1985): Gale ‘made CARE a significant and credible’ part of Australian politics (B. Moore); he was ‘our comrade and friend’ (A. Nzo); I. Gale, Kaplan interviews; HJ6: J. Brink to J. Gale, 30 April 1981; UN A/AC.115/ SR520: J. Gale to UN, 30 March 1983; Notes & Documents 18/83; discussion with ES Reddy, New York, 12 May 2006; interview with D Phillips, Melbourne, 28 October 2005.
was to play a pivotal role in popularising ANC policies. Funde worked on a wide front and was remarkably successful in building broad support, a tribute to his diplomacy and hard work, backed by wife Nosizwe and supporters. In his first week, he met South Africans and befriended NSW state parliamentarian Maurice Keane. On 10 December the African Liberation Trust Fund, aimed at financially aiding the office, was launched by prominent ALP, church, and union leaders Don Dunstan, Richard Wooton, and Cliff Dolan. By his second week, Funde had visited Melbourne and met ACTU and church leaders, federal and state ALP parliamentarians, and NGOs. Wide media publicity was secured. ANC Support groups now existed in Sydney and Melbourne. The following week Funde met Foreign Affairs officials, who reiterated conditions of acceptance for the opening of ANC/SWAPO offices: the ANC was ‘not granted a special privileged status’, and government would ‘not provide financial assistance’. Funde had to rely on donations from the broad movement.133

The movement clearly had to become more professional. Jim Gale convened a conference to decide future directions and where to base the ANC. Sydney unions offered space, so Melbourne concentrated on material support, sending much needed food and a typewriter. Reviewing his arrival in January and again in September, Funde reported office funding and equipment had come from unions such as the BWIU (later CFMEU), SUA, Mineworkers, WWF and Printing and Kindred Industries plus anti-apartheid bodies such as CARE (which had issued the invitation to come). But funding was below estimated minimum targets; Funde was ‘surviving from hand to mouth’ and even had to repay the loan for his air ticket. These organisations and others, such as the UAW, led by Audrey McDonald, and the Australian Peace Committee, offered vital material support. McDonald became a key organiser of ANC women’s tours and husband Tom and son Darren were instrumental in raising funds from unions. Funde soon identified embassy and media disinformation as a major obstacle to progress. Embassy lobbying of business, sport and political leaders, and mass distribution of glossy propaganda was diverting public attention from apartheid’s crimes and painting the ANC as ‘terrorists’. Funde began to overcome these obstacles, speaking widely in the media and creating a newsletter, Amandla.134

PAC competition loomed. Funde noted, ‘mainly because of our absence here … the PAC has been able to get some audience’ and visibility through the work of Christine and Vuyisa Qunta. Visits by PAC leaders were imminent and Funde worried about demands for dual support draining limited resources. SACTU also advised Funde they had appointed an Australian representative. With no government finance, his own funding from supporters only one third of expenses and some unions already pledged to a SACTU office, Funde was concerned. Alfred Nzo summed up the

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position as: ‘whether the support groups would manage to mobilise adequate support for both of you in the area. You will be the best judge.’ The consensus was that two offices would be difficult to resource.\textsuperscript{135}

Canberra’s acceptance of a SWAPO Office and its subsequent establishment in 1985 further complicated funding. Locating SWAPO in Melbourne partially offset pressure on resources and the two offices worked together, in some ways complementarily with the new focus on Namibia widening Australian perceptions of the regional dimensions of apartheid. Funde felt it important SWAPO came; Australia sat on the UN Council for Namibia. He called for support to build the SWAPO office and ANC supporters were most prominent. In 1986 the Australia-Namibia Solidarity Association (ANSA), chaired by Jean Mclean, formed. There were SWAPO students in Melbourne and Perth and in 1988 Pita Nghipandulwa became the first SWAPO student sponsored by the Australian Council of Churches. There was co-operation between the two liberation movements; the Victims of Apartheid Material Aid Campaign based in the Seamen’s Union, sent goods to both SWAPO and ANC refugees in Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{136}

By early 1984 Funde was ‘rather pleased with the reception’ and saw ‘quite a lot of possibilities both in political and material support’. He called for urgent and plentiful supplies of ANC publicity: on Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College, on ANC–PAC differences, and ANC News Briefings to explain recent events. Australia’s isolation meant few visits from ANC leaders, a problem when fast moving events inside South Africa required Funde’s prompt response to policy makers, for instance on direct links with internal bodies such as the UDF.\textsuperscript{137}

Funde, with limited resources and operating for several years without a deputy, had vast territory to cover: the entire continent of Australia, New Zealand, South Pacific islands. He toured widely in all Australian states and New Zealand. In early 1984, with the support of CARE, ACFOA and CICD, he visited Victoria and Canberra. In May, he spent ten packed days in New Zealand with costs shared by FOL and HART. FOL promised to sponsor a tour by Gertrude Shope and continue support. There were productive meetings with HART, unions, churches, aid organisation CORSO, and the Foreign Ministry. Funde was equally comfortable with high officials and grassroots: he met Labour leader Lange who promised to close the consulate if he won the election (promptly executed after his victory) and addressed a union meeting held outside the fence of an Auckland factory when management refused to let him enter. He expressed solidarity ‘on behalf of our struggling workers’ with striking Union Carbide workers.\textsuperscript{138}


\textsuperscript{137} APM1/5: E. Funde to S. Molifi, 15 June 1984 and J. Makatini, ANC International Department, 12 November 1986.

The ANC had seen New Zealand as ‘a stronghold of the PAC since Henry Isaac’s student days’. HART’s reluctance to split over the issue meant it maintained dual support. Yet if supporting the PAC, HART strove to avoid public differences; John Minto in 1983 told a visiting PAC leader, ‘We do not want the ANC/PAC debate raised in a divisive way either in public or within the movement’. Visits to ANC offices in Dar es Salaam and London by Rupert Watson of the Africa Information Centre improved ANC standing, which Funde assessed as receiving majority support in HART. In Christchurch he met with the ANC Support Group that worked to have an ANC student sponsored by student bodies.\(^{139}\)

Attending a Maori hui (meeting) near Napier, Funde was accorded a traditional welcome and remarked on the consensual way a dispute between Maori youth and elders was resolved: ‘I imagined that it could have been like this between the youth and the mother body of the ANC in the 40s’. He travelled with Maori on a bus to Auckland ‘singing and chanting old ‘izibongo’ in the way similar to ours … a good school for appreciating [Maori] cultural values’.\(^{140}\)

A four state tour of Australia in May–June was successful, gaining new contacts among politicians, unions and churches, and wide media publicity but necessitating ‘dynamic communication lines, more publicity work and … more resources’. His visit to Adelaide saw productive meetings with unions and donations to the ‘500 Freedom Club’ of the African Liberation Trust Fund. In Perth, there was wide media coverage and good meetings with ALP politicians, unions and churches. Funde spoke at a conference on peace in the Indian Ocean. In Queensland it was similar, meeting church, union, university and Aboriginal groups. The movement was not as strong here but dedicated activists together with unions (an AAM Trade Unions Subcommittee formed in 1985) developed solidarity. In Brisbane, the AAM Group formed and later hosted ANCWL leader Gertrude Shope. A meeting with teachers revealed pro-apartheid data in school textbooks ‘obviously obtained from the South African Government or its sympathetic sources’. Even in tiny Tasmania, Funde found strong allies among unions, ALP, peace, socialist, aid and church groups. He continued to tour: in 1985 visiting 28 New Zealand towns, addressing a big rally in Wellington and church synods. He launched a range of initiatives, disseminated information, built a support base among exiles, civil society, and government, and promoted scholarships and material support for the ANC and victims of apartheid.\(^{141}\)

ANC women made a major contribution. Funde’s wife Nosizwe worked tirelessly, speaking effectively to media, women’s and peace bodies and at International Women’s Day and South African Women’s Day functions. She and the UAW raised thousands of dollars for the ANC’s Mother and Child Kits Campaign. Visits by ANC and SWAPO women had great impact. In 1983 Mavis Nhlapo and 1984 Gertrude Shope, plus SWAPO’s Susan Nhindwinwa captivated meetings. Everyone marvelled at Shope’s

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140 E. Funde, ‘NZ Tour’.

persuasive powers and fortitude in a gruelling five week tour. Referring to Pretoria’s assassination attempts on exiles, Shope remarked on ‘her first good sleep in years during her time in Australia’. Tambo congratulated Funde and the UAW for facilitating Shope’s effective tour. Funde observed she had ‘opened doors we would not have been able to’. One such door was the Labor Party national conference that, breaking with convention, accorded Shope a hero’s welcome that was televised nationally. Funde saw new problems of growth: ‘The enthusiasm … will have also the volume of our work increased.’ Tambo wrote back that it was vital to ‘give your mission the capacity to cope with this explosion of progressive forces’. That task, however, would fall on the shoulders of the mission and its supporters, already under resourced.142

Speaking tours by prominent opponents of apartheid increased in 1984–85: Allan Boesak and Desmond Tutu, whose oration in Sydney was ‘dramatic and powerful, with people packed to the rafters’, and SACTU treasurer Kay Moonsamy. The ANC’s Johnny Makatini and SWAPO’s Andimba Toivo ja Toivo, recently released from Robben Island, attended a September 1985 Namibia Conference organised by CARE, one of their aims being to meet Australia’s foreign minister who, noted Funde, was ‘reluctant to meet officially’ with ANC and SWAPO. Funde, who had lived in Sweden, was firmly of the opinion it was time to impress on Australia and New Zealand the need ‘to assist us and give us the type of recognition we get from the Nordic countries’.143

Oliver Tambo’s extensive 1987 visit to Australia (two weeks) and New Zealand (one week) strengthened ANC legitimacy – in Funde’s words, it demonstrated it was a government-in-making – and demolished right wing propaganda that it was ‘terrorist’. Tambo’s articulate and mild manner undermined attacks by fanatics such as Bruce Ruxton, Victorian Returned Services League leader, who denigrated Tambo as a ‘black thug’. Tambo had head of state status. He received solidarity pledges from governments, unions, business and civic leaders. At a meeting, Prime Minister Hawke refused to commit to trade sanctions, to block individual sportspeople going to South Africa, or to close the embassy, but gave Tambo a ‘very warm reception’ and ‘understood why we had to resort to armed struggle’. Canberra presented a quite impressive list of actions: initiation of the EPG, closure of aviation, strengthened commitment to Gleneagles, sponsored visits by AAM leaders, scholarships, and permission to liberation movements to open offices. In Melbourne, Tambo stayed with Fraser who pledged ‘uncompromising support’ but conservative parties were ‘quite frank’ in opposing sanctions. Tiny groups of young conservatives wearing tyres around their necks sought to disrupt Tambo’s addresses, with little success; an American of the International Freedom Foundation later confessed he was paid to organise them. In New Zealand, support for Tambo was ‘magnificent’ as unions, churches and AAM ‘fully rallied behind the ANC’. Prime Minister Lange remarked that those who attacked the ANC

on violence ‘had no sense of history’. The ANC concluded there ‘is no way in which
the South African government can reassert its influence’ in the region.144

The ANC Mission concluded that the Tambo visit was a ‘watershed’ with ‘the
image and the understanding of both the ANC and our struggle’ greatly enhanced.
Media coverage in New Zealand was more positive and less sensational than Australia,
reflecting the political bias of the dominant Murdoch and Packer media. Meetings
with indigenous peoples ‘were of utmost importance in filling in the gaps in our
understanding’ of their problems. A Maori welcome was reciprocated by ‘OR’ Tambo
leading a freedom song. At Sydney Town Hall, where over 2 500 people heard Tambo
‘in absolute silence’, his address was preceded by both Nkosi Sikele’ iAfrika and an
Aboriginal dance performance.145

More high ranking ANC leaders followed: in 1988 Andrew Masondo, and
Pennuel Maduna (who attended sittings of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal
Deaths in Custody), Thomas Nkobi in 1989, and Nelson Mandela in 1990. All these
visits strengthened sanctions. Funde could see sporting ties were important and
was able to encourage government to go further: in discussions before an important
Commonwealth meeting, Hawke asked Funde whether Australia should proceed on
sanctions without Thatcher. Funde urged him to do so. If this was the view at the top,
then it was grassroots pressure from below from diverse anti-apartheid organisations
that helped create it.146

Inside the AAM (1): The organisations and their campaigns

By the 1980s a wide range of organisations opposed apartheid, comprising four
components: anti-apartheid/anti-racist networks; purely anti-apartheid bodies; ANC
support groups; and supportive groups such as union, church, women’s and peace
groups. In New Zealand, HART and CARE remained active and the 1980s also saw
ANC support groups established.

The Australian ‘architecture’ was complicated. CARE was a loose umbrella body
involving at times 20–30 constituent or affiliated groups. Constituents included
SACARE, WACARE, Illawarra CARE, Luthuli Group, Anti-Apartheid (Brisbane),
Action against Apartheid (based in the WWF in remote Darwin), student based
UWACARE, Adelaide University CARE, and Wollongong University CARE, the
ANC/SWAPO Solidarity Committee in Adelaide, plus Aboriginal Land Councils and
the Committee to Defend Black Rights. There were small CARE groups in Victoria
and Tasmania. Affiliates included church, union, and peace bodies. The Australian
Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAAM (Victoria)) was a CARE constituent, with 200

144 APM 2/25: ‘Notes on Visit’ and ‘Report on Comrade President Oliver Tambo’s Visit to Australia and New Zealand’. Tambo Papers, B61 c.2.4.2; Program; ‘South Africa: Actions Taken by the Australian Government 1983-7’; Fraser, Funde interviews; CARE Newsletter 81/82 (1987); O. Tambo, 75 Years of Struggle (Bundoora: La Trobe University, 1987); Canberra Times, 3 April 1987.
146 Funde interview.
paid members in late 1987; but AAAM (NSW), with slightly more members, was not. Alongside these was a growing network of ANC support groups working to mobilise local South African communities and to focus resources to support the ANC office.

These diverse groups produced and distributed inventive resources: newsletters, posters, stickers, leaflets, even mock South African ‘passbooks’ for protests, and they distributed IDAF and UN kits to schools. They adopted varied tactics: pickets, weeks of action, letters, lobbying, sport disruption, conferences, tours, rallies, fund raising concerts, consumer boycotts, film festivals, art exhibitions, information stalls, and demonstrations at petrol pumps. A ‘week of action’ in June 1986 captures the movement’s breadth. Action against Apartheid in Darwin boycotted supermarket Coles. Illawarra CARE held a picket, film show, hosted Funde, and launched a campaign to make Wollongong an ‘Apartheid-Free City’. Anti-Apartheid, Brisbane held Shell and Coles pickets and a church service. AAAM (Victoria) launched a Shell campaign and held a candle light march and vigil. AAAM (NSW) held a vigil, picket, rally, concert, film, and a 10 km run to the airport to protest South African Airways (SAA). SACARE held an anti-racism conference, rally and concert, and Shell picket. WACARE held a Rock against Racism and picketed Shell, SAA and Coles. The Luthuli Group sponsored a Rage against Apartheid concert and placed a press advertisement.147

‘Shun Shell’ was a major campaign in all states but sharpest in Melbourne which hosted Shell’s Australian headquarters. AAAM (Victoria), ANC/SWAPO representatives, unions, and the Uniting Church’s Wooton led the charge, with pickets, posters, stickers, attendance at Shell meetings and international liaison with unions to monitor oil sanctions busting. A week of action against Shell in November 1987 and a fortnight in May 1988 raised the tempo. A wide range of bodies from Australian Democrats to Wilderness Society and public service unions joined; the University of Melbourne cancelled Shell petrol cards. By November, Funde perceived a move by Shell Australia to apologise for its involvement with apartheid, but Shell then launched an attack on the Uniting Church, which Funde urged all AAM groups to defend. With change in South Africa in 1990, Shell Australia’s Kevin Gosper supported the movement for democracy, but Shell International ‘never really accepted the evil that it had done’. Pressure remained for sanctions in other areas: in 1989, AAAM (Victoria) attacked BHP’s joint gold prospecting venture with Angolvaal.148

The anti-apartheid movement in Australia was not just a single, uniform central body: it was a complex coalition of organisations with regional variations and, sometimes, differences. Funde established the ANC Office in Sydney, the largest city in Australia, but other centres also were significant. In 1987 AAAM (NSW) was attracting about the same number of people to its meetings and had the same estimated number of people on its mailing list as WACARE in Perth, a city four times

147 CARE Newsletter, 77, 78 (1986).
smaller. The AAAM (Victoria) produced more, and deeper, analysis of economic sanctions than other states and, with Wooton, led the Shell campaign. Diversity did not lessen the ANC’s central role; as Ken McAlpine, active in Melbourne and Adelaide argues, what distinguished the AAM from other solidarity movements was the ANC’s leadership role and clear programme. But to be effective the AAM needed to be an *Australian* political movement, not a branch of the ANC. It is in the wider regional history of the movement that its rich texture, creativity, and social agency are best viewed, though in turn this must relate back to central, national, and international forces; moreover it should be kept in mind that some people were active across different organisations.149

The CARE network

South Australia, with SACARE and CARE’s national office, was an important anti-apartheid node built around a core of dedicated activists. CARE National handled national and international coordination, edited the substantial national *Newsletter*, liaised over tours, and assisted the establishment and maintenance of the ANC office. SACARE focused on local campaigns. CARE had to push to get beyond sport sanctions for the Liberal Party was ideologically, and the ALP pragmatically, opposed to economic sanctions. Yet Australia had a sizeable, informed anti-apartheid section of the population, with strong support from the ALP Left, communist parties, and unions. The ALP helped CARE with parliamentary receptions for anti-apartheid visitors and offices. Most unions were broadly anti-apartheid if only some, notably maritime unions, took industrial action on the issue. Activists disseminated their message widely: in 1986 Sybil Wakefield saw her primary school students suitably impressed with visiting ANC speaker Prince Cassock of Radio Freedom; Sister Mary Emory, one time SACARE secretary, brought her students onto the street against apartheid.150

In Perth, fast moving events in South Africa stimulated rapid growth. From 1983 WACARE was strong enough to hold major marches in Perth or Fremantle, attracting 500 people in November 1987 and forming three branches. It had ongoing campaigns on Shell, supermarkets, rebel teams and political prisoners. Close ties with unions developed, culminating in free office space from the BWIU, allowing better organising, an anti-apartheid library and collection of material aid, coordinated with maritime unions who took industrial action against every visiting South African ship. The Labour Council and other unions such as metalworkers were supportive, monitoring imports. If ALP governments condemned apartheid, they were reluctant to disturb trade. CARE had good relations with the ALP and its MPs such as Senator Patricia Giles. There were problems. ‘A flood of white Rhodesians and South Africans’ plagued activists with death threats. Mining ties increased. The right wing Clerks’ Union opposed sanctions. There were anxieties from Funde over nationwide CARE

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support for Aboriginal struggles, but as Kaplan explains, cooler relations ‘didn’t diminish our support for ANC in any way’. Interestingly, whilst Funde sidelined SACARE politically, he did not execute the same manoeuvre in Perth, possibly owing to WACARE’s close contact with ANC cadres. Some core WACARE officials were lured away interstate by ANC and SWAPO offices. Official PAC visits to Perth were rare; CARE, its student branch and union allies remained pro-ANC.\footnote{Kaplan interview.}

As struggles inside South Africa intensified and as WACARE increasingly identified publicly with the ANC, they attracted progressive South Africans. Glen Mashinini, born in Soweto, came to Australia in 1980. His family was one of the very few African families to overcome an immigration ‘points system’ that favoured wealthy white people. Glen’s father Jack, who had a general store in Soweto, waited four years to emigrate to help his children. He worked as a driver and his wife Joyce was active in the Uniting Church. Glen teamed up with WACARE and was Race Relations Officer at Curtin University where, with another black South African, Wendy Rose, he set up a UN Human Rights Office. Glen and sister Lindiwe helped found the African Cultural Group, which if nonpolitical brought together local Africans and created a cultural ambience to introduce youth to Africa – and eventually some to the AAM. Mashinini became increasingly involved in ANC work, liaised effectively with WACARE, and visited remote regions such as the Pilbara and Carnarvon to build support for the ANC.\footnote{Discussion with G. Mashinini, Johannesburg, 16 October 2005; WACARE News, August 1986.}

Lloyd Martin, active in WACARE in Perth and ANC in Sydney, arrived in August 1983. His uncle Les Martin was in the ANC and went into exile in Zambia. Lloyd became involved in civic struggles and, hearing from his sister in Perth that her family ‘was treated almost normally’, migrated. In Perth he joined South African sports clubs to make contacts for most compatriots could not yet be organised politically, though some early contacts, such as Louis Hollander, later joined ANC support groups. Like Kaplan, Martin was immediately struck by the racism but, being black, felt the brunt personally. He marched in a large anti-apartheid rally and in weeks was secretary of WACARE, whose work was good, he feels, with excellent committees on sanctions. Recognising his political acumen, organising skills and great energy, Funde in 1987 convinced Martin to relocate to Sydney; WACARE’s loss was the ANC’s gain.\footnote{L. Martin interview, Sydney, 31 October 2005; ‘Lloyd Martin’, AAR, 162-8.}

Another ‘scoop’ was Sheila Suttner, who arrived in October 1984. She migrated after the jailing and torture of her son Raymond, sentenced in 1975 to seven and a half years’ prison for ANC underground work and in 1986 for UDF work. Like Martin and Mashinini, she brought authenticity and direct insight. She also brought a personal angle few could contest and which she masterfully used in the media to raise awareness. An eloquent speaker, she captivated audiences from union stop-work meetings and Rotary to South African Women’s Day breakfasts. Suttner was pleasantly shocked when her first anti-apartheid rally had a police escort! Another big difference was race relations: instead of master–servant relations, she enjoyed
working with black people in the movement. Suttner saw no contradiction in fighting jointly for black rights in Australia and South Africa, joining Aboriginal leader Clarrie Isaacs in a land rights battle over the Swan River Brewery.\footnote{Seamen’s Journal (March 1988), 81–83; interview with S. Suttner, 4 October 2005.}

Rank and file activists can bring special insights. Lenore Howard lived as a child in South Africa, where her Welsh mother Enid Howard was active in the Congress of Democrats, before coming to Sydney and joining FOA. Both became dedicated CARE cadres in Perth. Enid was extremely generous, giving thousands of dollars to the ANC. Lenore recalls that community support made anti-apartheid work easier – ‘lots of ordinary people were not buying South African goods’. Yet it was not always easy to get this support. Juanita Doorey came to Perth in 1986 from New Zealand where she had taken part in HART protests. She feels it was harder to work locally than globally, ‘to get beyond the comfort zone of talking to the converted’, such as when she confronted entertainer Rolf Harris at a mall over his South African visits. She recalls Sheila Suttner’s activism and that her son’s imprisonment gave a personal focus that ‘crystallized’ the struggle. Music also was an important avenue for solidarity. When the Labour Council funded the Working Voices Choir, Doorey joined and \textit{Nkosi Sikelel’iAfrika} became a core repertoire sung at solidarity functions.\footnote{Interview with L. Howard, 8 October 2005; ‘Nelson Mandela: A 40 Year Campaign’, Subiaco Post, November 1990; Doorey interview; CARE Newsletter 75, 1986.}

In Canberra, the Luthuli Group was part of the CARE network. Donald Denoon had taught African history in Uganda and Papua New Guinea before coming to the Australian National University in 1981. Neville Curtis had been doing anti-apartheid work but there was little organisation. They joined with others to form the Luthuli Group, choosing the name in the hope it might be unifying, given that Luthuli was ANC head before the PAC split. While the PAC attracted young radicals, the Luthuli Group mobilised university people, teachers, and public servants, performing a ‘consular’ role for visiting ANC/SWAPO figures. They organised occasional demonstrations to capture attention, petitions, and placed advertisements in the press. There was hostility from conservatives, but the group worked determinedly to influence bureaucrats and diplomats to accept the idea of an ANC government and helped stem the influence of Pretoria’s embassy.\footnote{Denoon interview; Denoon, ‘Sharpeville Remembered’, Amandla, 6, 2, (1988); Jennett, ‘Signals’.

The AAMs

The movement in Melbourne does not fit neatly into categories. It joined CARE, left, then joined again. It supported ANC/SWAPO, not always comfortably. It led economic sanctions campaigns and protested tennis sanctions busters. It had many names. From the 1970s it became Community Aid Abroad–Southern Africa and, in 1983, ANC Support Group. In 1984 after the arrival of Funde, and on his insistence, it became the Anti-Apartheid Group (AAG) then Anti-Apartheid, Melbourne (AA-M). Dissolving in September 1985 it was reborn in 1986 as the Australian Anti-Apartheid Movement (Victoria), a constituent of CARE.
In the early 1980s Jeanne Daly continued to co-ordinate fund raising and letter writing to support political prisoners such as Dennis Goldberg, Eddie Daniels on Robben Island, death row prisoner James Mange, and Raymond Suttner. Saul Bastomsky wrote a pamphlet to distribute at productions of the *Jail Diary of Albie Sachs*. Tim Bruwer took part in regular pickets outside SAA, adeptly using his Afrikaans accent to disarm passers by that supported the regime, and in letters to the press exposed efforts by those claiming change in South Africa, saying ‘I am an Afrikaner, I know what they are thinking!’\(^{157}\)

ANC visitors, notably Andrew Molotsane for six weeks in 1981 and Mavis Nhlapo and Gertrude Shope in 1983/1984, stimulated change in the movement. The need to host such visitors required a more structured organisation, suggested to them by Nhlapo. In the meantime, more South Africans had joined, including Richard Johnstone, Annie Goldblatt and Annie McGrindle. As the group grew, so activities expanded. In 1984 they protested at SAA, collected materials to send to SWAPO refugees and sent a food hamper for Funde and purchased a typewriter for $1 000 for his office. They agreed to support both CARE and the ANC, but then voted to disaffiliate with CARE, wanting full autonomy.\(^{158}\)

AA-M with an Economics Committee including academics Peter Richardson and Richard Johnstone carried out important work on sanctions. Supermarkets were monitored and lists of imports and pamphlets on economic ties written and distributed. Melbourne University’s Council and Staff Association agreed to disinvest. The movement joined the Uniting Church in regular Friday pickets outside SAA and held protests and concerts. A successful tour by Archbishop Tutu strengthened the body. The local Anglican Church, oddly not knowing what to do with Tutu, allowed AA-M to organise his talk. There also were tensions: demographic, political, gender, and racial. In a city of three million people, South Africans were widely spread. White academics inhabited the inner city; coloured families lived in outer suburbs. As the group grew to reach a paper membership of 150, it decided not to form branches. When inner city Fitzroy Town Hall was chosen as meeting venue, outer suburbanites objected. In addition, President Basil Weaich was upset that other black South Africans did not join ANC education classes run by a white South African. Students asserted their feminism, sometimes in an insensitive way to black women workers.\(^{159}\)

Other factors complicated problems of growth. Indefatigable SWAPO leader Susan Nghidinwa had sent HQ a glowing report on the AA-M in 1984. In March 1985, the SWAPO permanent representative Hadino Hishongwa arrived. He had been based in Sweden where liberation movement offices were well funded. With locals struggling even to support the ANC office, a material basis existed for tension. The Uniting Church helped SWAPO obtain a Melbourne office, which opened in July, but frustration over

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158 A-AMP: M. Nhlapo, ANC Women’s Secretariat to J. Daly, 12 July 1983; Phillips interview; A-AMP: AAG Melbourne minutes, 7 April, 7 October 1984.
scarce funds stoked discord, at a time of heightened worry over Pretoria’s dirty tricks. Between June and September 1985 there were unwise (and later seen to be untrue) accusations of spies, efforts at expulsion of movement veterans, and disintegration of an effective group. A letter signed by SWAPO and ANC representatives stated they would no longer work with the AA-M. Some members resigned, apologising for ‘arrogant and inappropriate’ communications; others pointed to an overly paranoid and bureaucratic mode of operation by SWAPO. This was not on purely racial lines; black members Basil and Amy Weaich and Willie Williams refused to go along with Hishongwa. That the subsequent SWAPO representative, Joe Kaapanda, after 1987 reconciled with so called spies suggests Hishongwa committed errors of judgement.

ANC officials closed ranks with SWAPO in a formalistic solidarity that reached unreal proportions when the ANC office refused to accept remaining monies as the AA-M dissolved in September 1985. There was a temporary organisational vacuum: when Tambo toured in 1987, the Victorian Fabian Society had to host him, as no effective AAM existed. Such incidents did not prevent the eventual growth of the movement, but they did dissipate energies.160

Both liberation movement offices operated with acute ‘financial problems, racist attacks, break-ins in their offices and robberies in their homes’, with ‘much of their time … taken up in fund raising which should have been used for political work’. Despite problems, the work of Kaapanda and Hishongwa (who was a good speaker) greatly raised Australian consciousness on Namibia, led to scholarships and other aid, and obliged Canberra to deal directly with SWAPO. Both men toured Australia. Hishongwa visited New Zealand in 1986, meeting with six ministers, and attended the South Pacific Forum in Fiji, prompting the Vanuatu prime minister Father Walter Lini to recognise SWAPO. Hishongwa’s then wife, Ndeutala, also addressed meetings. With independence looming, Kaapanda left in 1989, leaving SWAPO Representation in the hands of ANSA but asking people to direct support to CARE; suggesting strong CARE support for SWAPO may have been another complicating factor in ANC-CARE relations. The work of SWAPO and Namibians helped bolster the movement, widening its horizons, and encouraged Australia to take seriously its role on the UN Council for Namibia, with Australian armed forces deployed there at independence.161

The Australian Anti-Apartheid Movement (Victoria) took the place of AA-M in 1986. Led by committed activists John Howe and John Moody, it was prominent on sports boycotts and economic sanctions, Shell and consumer boycotts and divestment. In 1989, it denounced the role of Hugh Morgan, Western Mining Company director, appointed to the World Gold Council, considered a South African front, and the action of the WA state government’s Gold Corporation, run by South African Donald Mackay-Coghill. Future South African sports minister Ngconde Balfour, studying in Melbourne,

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was an inspiration to the group. By this time, a South African ANC Support Committee had been formed in Melbourne and cooperated on campaigns. Unlike the AAAM in NSW, the Victorian AAM joined and worked closely with CARE. 162

Sometimes those outside formal structures can see organisational weaknesses. Penelope Andrews came to Australia in 1986. She grew up in Cape Town’s Kensington and Bonteheuwel, witnessing forced removals and violence against women in poor, working class communities. After working, Andrews studied in Natal where she became involved in Black Consciousness and later studied in the US, where she spoke out against apartheid. In Melbourne she did the same, being invited to speak to academic, human rights, and women’s groups. She saw disconnects in Australia between the ANC and the broader anti-apartheid movement, and between South African coloured communities and the ANC. She connected with Aboriginal struggles but some black South African immigrants were quite contemptuous of them. Some ANC and AAM people in Australia had sexist attitudes. In retrospect, Andrews feels it a pity the larger AAM was not able to more creatively engage with other anti-racist movements.163

The Australian Anti-Apartheid Movement (NSW) (AAAM), founded in 1983 in Sydney, was broad based. It organised pickets outside SAA, Shell, and the South African Consulate, held rallies and benefit concerts, and worked closely with the ANC office. In June 1987, it organised a march of 500 people led by Funde, AAAM President Kolin Thumbadoo and Aboriginal church leader Charles Harris. According to Pat Wagner, Thumbadoo, from Durban, had such a voice that in full flight at pickets he made consulate officials cringe. Unlike the ANC that felt constrained by its semi diplomatic status, AAAM took part in solidarity actions with Aboriginal rights bodies such as the Committee to Defend Black Rights and spoke out in support of Aboriginal rights during the bicentennial of White Invasion in 1988. The main focus of its work, however, was anti-apartheid mobilisation and consciousness raising in which it was very successful.164

The ANC and its support groups

The detailed history of the ANC in Australia is little known. Members had visited from the 1960s and a few Congress Alliance figures, such as Les Stone, had migrated before Funde’s arrival. The opening of an ANC office reduced isolation and encouraged some South Africans to become ANC supporters or members. Funde recalls that after arriving he was met by Stone, who in August 1983 cofounded the ANC Sydney Support Group, following a proposal by Mavis Nhlapo. In 1985, at the age of 68, Stone wrote to Funde to join the ANC; later at a rally, he proudly waved his ANC


163 Interview (telephonic) with P. Andrews, Saskatchewan, 7 September 2005.

card. There were other ANC supporters and members and their history too is an important part of the movement.\textsuperscript{165}

Facing a crisis of resources and wary of becoming too involved in Australian politics, Funde built a web of ANC support groups, some aimed at mobilising South Africans, others widely based. If the number of these groups was dazzling and perhaps duplicative, it must be remembered the ANC had an eye on the future to secure support for elections and return of émigrés. Unlike earlier groups with their radical base, there was more emphasis on respectability. The Australian ANC Support Committee (ANCSC) based in Sydney brought together figures from church, union, women’s, media, business, and legal sectors as well as the ALP and Democrats. Former ACTU leader Cliff Dolan served as president, Helen McCue as secretary. They met with government leaders, including Hawke, supporting his progressive policy on apartheid, but lobbying for more effective sanctions and funding of the ANC. The ANCSC published an influential anti-apartheid magazine, \textit{Amandla}. Sub committees addressed union, church, women, health and other sectors. The Health Group held workshops, distributed anti-apartheid information, and gained affiliates such as the Doctors’ Reform Society. The Union Group won 15 major unions as affiliates. The Uniting Church and Australian Council of Churches were active on several fronts, strongly endorsing the ‘Shun Shell’ campaign and visits from anti-apartheid clergy.\textsuperscript{166}

The South Africa ANC Support Group (Sydney) (SAANCSG), formed in early 1987, was rather different. Based mainly among South Africans, it focused on providing ‘moral, material and political aid’ to the ANC in Australia. It liaised with the AAAM and was strong in Sydney’s western suburbs, notably Liverpool, where active members such as Pat Wagner travelled the considerable distance into central Sydney to assist the ANC office and its radio programme. Wagner, another District Six resident to settle in Australia, in 1977, was a teacher and helped develop anti-apartheid feeling inside the NSW Teachers’ Federation, which formed its own ANC Support Committee. Under Funde’s direction, he helped bring together progressive South Africans such as Lorna Fortuin, Vernon Roodt, Eugene Hendricks, and Graeme Samuels. Funde patiently built support among the social clubs of local South Africans, such as the Southern African Cultural Collective, which had sponsored a visit of writer Bessie Head in 1984 and painted an anti-apartheid mural at Sydney Railway Station. By 1987, SAANCSG was providing much needed logistical support to Funde and was effective in fund raising. There were other groups, including South Coast and North Coast ANC Support Groups, and the Sydney West AAM.\textsuperscript{167}


\textsuperscript{166} APM 10/35: C. Dolan to Hawke, 22 July 1986; APM 1/8: H. McCue to PKIU, 28 September 1989; APM 1/9: AANCSC 1990 Annual Report. In 1989, the ANCSG received $4,100 from union affiliates and $9,154 in donations.

\textsuperscript{167} APM 1/8: Manifesto, SAANCSG; SAANCSG to ANC, 26 November 1987, Focal Point, 1988, South Coast ANCSG to Funde, 11 December 1989; APM 1/2: A. Fersom to Funde, 15 October 1988; Wagner interview. SAANCSG saw itself as a political support group not purely a fund-raising social body: APM 1/9, G. Samuels to Funde, 22 February 1988, A Spencer to Ntshinga, 27 October 1993; ‘Lorna Zoe’, \textit{AAR}, 127-34.
An ANC support group formed in Melbourne, where Terrence February, brother of MK fighter Basil February, became a central figure. In 1986 Funde wrote to ANC secretary general Nzo that February ‘has worked very hard and has contributed a lot to our work’. February visited Lusaka with Funde and had discussions there with Chris Hani and Reg September. He carried out ANC work in Melbourne and in rural Victoria, organising public demonstrations, liaising with unions, churches and NGOs, and assisting the AAG to raise funds. February also helped with the establishment and work of the SWAPO Office.168

The ANC/SWAPO Solidarity Committee (ANCSSC), later ANC Solidarity Group (South Australia), formed in Adelaide in January 1987. According to Irene Gale, an ANC directive to SACARE announced they should cease ‘political work’ and concentrate on aid, as this new group would ‘take over’ the movement’s political leadership. ‘It seemed pointless to fight this as we needed to work with the ANC so we stepped back and supported it’. To South African Sybil Wakefield, CARE was not focused entirely on apartheid. She supported Funde’s view that the ANC was in Australia at Canberra’s invitation, and with CARE often critical of government treatment of Aboriginal people and Funde’s focus squarely on South Africa, ‘he couldn’t, he didn’t want to be distracted, or under the umbrella of such a broad focus’. Yet even as Wakefield became active in ANCSSC, she remained for some time in CARE, acting as liaison. She and Basil Moore had been staunch SACARE people. Differences of opinion did not stop broader unity. Gale concedes the new group ‘didn’t do too badly and got the support of the churches and unions that we had built up’. Wakefield acknowledges SACARE always supported the new group. ANCSSC became effective in fund raising, ran a radio programme, brought in new people, and launched campaigns. Wakefield feels it did better with a single focus: it was ‘very active over the whole kaleidoscope of sanctions’, with pickets against slate and diamond importers and sport. Women’s Day functions were very successful. South Australian premier Don Dunstan remained very supportive. By the 1980s, there were more Africans in town: Don Ngakane from Soweto, who had taught at Somafo, studied under the Jim Gale Memorial African Scholarship Trust Fund and was active. All this growing prominence brought harassment from racists: National Action sprayed the cars and slashed the tyres of activists.169

Algernon (‘Junior’) van der Hoeven was prominent in the ANCSSC. Born in Athlone, he was a building worker who migrated to Australia in 1977 ‘because of sheer frustration’ with apartheid. He first joined SACARE if, unlike Wakefield, not being prominent and later became an ANSSC leader. In May 1986, he applied to join the ANC. He challenged entrenched white South African migrants; elected president of Adelaide’s South African Australian Social Club, he moved the insertion of an anti-apartheid constitutional clause. Some of these white people had thinly veiled racist views: vice president Bill Swift was reported saying, ‘you can’t be for the blacks which

169 I. Gale, Wakefield interviews; Adelaide Advertiser, October 1993; Solidarity Update, June 1988.
means you’re against your family’; Perth engineer Charles Roberts of the South Africa Club claimed ‘The black has no place in South Africa – he’s a foreigner there’.170

In Perth, a substantial presence of pro-ANC South African émigrés came together in 1989 to form the ANC Support Group of WA (ANCSG); after 1990, there was a formal ANC unit. Some members held important positions in post-apartheid South Africa, including Glen Mashinini, Xolani Mkhwanazi, Titus ‘Tissa’ Kotsoe, and Basil and Sherreen van der Merwe. The group also included Thembu and Thabile Mhlambo, Nambitha Madikize, Romeo Cupido, white South Africans including Sheila Suttner, Marc Newhouse, Marcus Cox, Michelle Cohen and Gavin and Linda Crockett, and Australians, notably Amanda Gillett. It aimed to support the ANC to raise awareness of the struggle and mobilise support ‘with the guidance of the chief ANC representative in Australia’.171

Mkhwanazi had been an MK fighter in Angola and Swaziland (where he survived an assassination attempt). He came to Australia in 1988 as a political refugee. Politically astute with ANC, MK and SACP influences, he ‘had a very catalytic impact, and went out of his way to make connections with different organisations’ such as CARE. Tissa Kotsoe, from Soweto, escaped to Botswana after 1976 and from 1989 studied at Curtin University with wife Rachel, a dental specialist at Mazimbu, the first student funded by the Southern African Scholarship Foundation (SASF). Mashinini, Mkhwanazi, and Kotsoe worked closely with CARE and, on the initiative of Funde, established the ANCSG to pull in local South Africans. More politicised members constituted an ANC unit helping Funde give political direction to the ANSCG, which organised political and social functions and channelled funds to the ANC Office. In September 1990, ANCSG and WACARE brought together ANC speakers with Kenyan Ngugi wa Thiong’o in a poignant expression of African solidarity with Ngugi referring to the ANC as ‘father and mother of all modern political movements in Africa’. The ANCSG had an educational role, teaching members about ANC history so they could speak with confidence. There was strong solidarity from unions and student and women’s movements. The ANCSG and WACARE organised joint functions and joint executive meetings, with WACARE extending use of its office, telephone and library. Basil van der Merwe, ANCSG convenor, recalls ‘you would think Australians were South Africans they were so supportive!’172

Van der Merwe and his wife came to Perth in 1988. Sherreens had worked with Black Sash and witnessed the cruelty of the apartheid health sector. Basil as a lawyer had seen how black people were criminalised. Within months of arrival, local cadres asked him to help form the ANCSG. He saw the need for wider solidarity. For two years he worked for the Aboriginal Legal Service. He quickly detected racism: ‘When

171 WACARE Papers: ANCSGWA minutes 8 July 1989, Constitution 1989; interview with A. Gillett, Pretoria, 16 October 2005. Gillett had been involved through CARE and, with Peter Reeves and Joan Wardrop of Curtin University founded SASF.
we marched with our [ANC] banners we got racist abuse from white Australians’. Through rallies, concerts and Women’s Day events the group grew and took on a socially integrating role. Sherreen recalls ‘we now met Africans, and saw them as beautiful; the AAM was colour blind … and allowed us to grow’. Whilst there were some problems – Gillett notes the ANCSG had problems with sexism, and one white South African was expelled for trying to extend fund raising to include the IFP – Basil feels the group ‘helped the men to try and change their views’. Sherreen, influenced by the strong self worth of Australian women, built a support group for South African women in Perth.173

There were interesting family and personal involvements. Children danced under the ANC flag at events. Older South Africans offered an inspiration: to Marc Cox, Sheila Suttner was ‘an embodiment of “you strike the woman you strike the rock”’. To Angie Hartwig, Joyce and Jack Mashinini were ‘like the mother and father of the struggle’. Marc Newhouse, who grew up in Durban, went back in the early 1980s. He was politicised when, working outside East London, he saw the super exploitation of farm workers and helped organised a strike. Returning to Australia, he became actively involved in the ANCSG. Marc Cox, also from Durban, refused to join the apartheid army in 1987, moving to his mother’s New Zealand that, ‘very active and strong on anti-apartheid issues, was a huge politicisation’. Returning briefly to South Africa, he smuggled in illegal ANC/SACP publications. Facing a military police warrant, he came to Perth in 1989 where he linked up with the ANC cell. Michelle Cohen had been a social worker in Cape Town and was politicised by the UDF’s rise. Coming to Perth in 1987, she met Sheila Suttner and became active in CARE and ANCSG, where she worked with other ANC supporters such as Wendy Rose.174

Raymond Suttner, after over ten years of jail, torture, and house arrest, visited Australia at the end of 1989. He recalls that sitting in jail in 1981 it was very important for prisoner morale to hear of the break up of rugby tours: warders were angry. As part of the internal UDF leadership, Suttner was able to explain fast moving changes inside South Africa during his visit and move Australian thinking towards deeper social analysis of apartheid. In Perth, he addressed a very successful ANCSG benefit and spoke at a major rally, a packed university lecture, and union stop-work meetings. In Sydney, he had talks with ANC people and media interviews, and spoke at more well attended meetings. As Michelle Cohen observes, he had a profound influence on her, and on many local people, as few Australians really understood the changes taking place in South Africa.175

Thus there was a growing number of ANC officials, cadres, and students in Australia. A good number either applied for formal ANC membership or were appointed by Funde: as Lloyd Martin notes, ‘I joined the ANC, but never filled in a form; we had formal membership after the visit of Madiba’. Funde asked Martin to coordinate the


174 Van der Merwe, Newhouse, Cox, Hartwig, and M. Cohen (Perth, 10 October 2005) interviews.

175 West Australian, 12 December 1989; R. Suttner, South Africa: Apartheid in Crisis (Perth: WACARE, 1990); Suttner, Cohen interviews.
ANCsGs so the ANC office could concentrate on dealing with Canberra. Much of Martin’s work was keeping the groups active and feeding them information. A formal ANC structure developed. Appointed ANC cadres such as Martin, February, and van de Merwe took leadership roles and there were ANC regional political committees, with annual national conferences.

Vernon Roodt, who worked on the ANC Sydney radio programme, was another fully fledged ANC member. Others to seek membership or work for the ANC Office were Kabelo and Charlotte Makobo, Steven Rametse, Thami Nqayi, and Frank Forman (son of Lionel and Sadie Forman) and his wife Robyn. Rametse attended the 1982 ANC Youth Conference in Botswana, but left after the murderous SADF raid of 1985. The lives of these exiles are an interesting part of the ANC’s overseas history. Some had young families, all lacked resources, but they contributed to the liberation movement. Funde was sympathetic to their plight, finding them appropriate tasks, even helping them in other ways, not easy given his own meagre resources. For its part, Canberra clung to its policy of refusing to provide material support to the ANC office, on the spurious basis that if it did so, it would also have to fund the PLO.¹⁷⁶

Funde also requested New Zealand allies to form a support group. In 1982, inspired by John Osmers’ 1981 visit, Glen McLennan had formed a ‘small but active’ NZANC Support Group in Christchurch, distributing 80 copies of Sechaba. ANC Aotearoa, based in Wellington with New Zealander Rupert Watson as convenor, now formed. If purposefully not ‘mass based’ it helped with fund raising and lobbying (such as over the Robert McBride case), had a monthly radio programme, assisted the Nelson Mandela Scholar, Gcinile Mabilu, organised ANC-Mandela Fun Runs, and sponsored the 1988 visit by ANC cultural troupe Amandla. It saw itself as complementing, not competing with HART. Its formal launch on 27 July 1989 was addressed by Foreign Minister Russell Marshall, who reported on his recent warm reception in Lusaka by the ANC. ANC Aotearoa arranged a meeting with Jim Bolger – the first time a National Party leader had agreed to meet a liberation movement.¹⁷⁷

The ‘old’ movement was changing. By the mid 1980s, ‘John [Brink] was getting old and Eddie Funde from the ANC had arrived.’ Vitriolic right wing anti-ANC propaganda during Tambo’s tour finally drove Brink’s CAASA to break with its ‘neutrality’ on recognition of liberation movements to defend the ANC, but when Jane Harris and others decided to actively support the ANC, he opposed them. CAASA dissolved amicably. A new body, the Mandela Foundation, arose in August 1987, and was formally launched at the Sydney performance of Amandla in May 1988 as ‘an independent body cooperating with the ANC’. Funde wanted a body to raise


funds. Like SADAF before it, the foundation projected the image of Sydney ‘North Shore’ respectability; only in 1991 did it allow open membership. It focused on fund raising dinners and concerts, sending money to IDAF and Somafco. Fund raising never reached great amounts, but in just one year, 1990, $2 400 went to IDAF, $1 000 to Luthuli Cultural and Welfare Association and $2 250 for emergency aid to ANC students. Another impact was publicity. Sponsors were not just ALP figures such as Hawke and Whitlam but Liberals Fraser, Ian McPhee and Alexander Downer. National president was Don Dunstan. The foundation was involved in a range of solidarity functions, visits by ANC figures, and human rights campaigns: in 1988, it coordinated a nationwide press advertisement to protest judicial murder of the Sharpeville Six.178

Mandela Foundation activists included remarkable people. Lynnette Simons was greatly influenced in her youth by her uncle, Jack Simons, and Ray Alexander, ANC/SACP veterans. It was when she migrated to New Zealand in 1972 and worked as a journalist that she began to hear what was really happening in South Africa. The 1981 Tour in Palmerston North was her first big anti-apartheid march. From 1975, she had maintained a correspondence with Jack and Ray. After moving to Sydney in 1983, she visited them in Lusaka in 1986 when Ray urged her to meet with Funde. She became involved, making an effective ABC radio documentary ‘Women in the Struggle’, and then in Sydney teamed up with Jane Harris on the Mandela Foundation. Jane had been a member of the Liberal Party in South Africa. Her brother John, a member of the African Resistance Movement, was executed on 1 April 1965. She spent four years in the UK, joined the AAM, and came to Australia in 1973, soon joining the ALP and SADAF and was a foundation member of CARE, maintaining a good relationship also with SALC. In the Mandela Foundation, Harris and Simons joined with other tireless workers such as Maurie Keane and movement veteran Hazel Jones.179

Funde was chronically over worked; a deputy was difficult to support. Ndumiso Ntshinga eventually came in 1988. He saw ‘great sympathy’ from the average Australian for the ANC and highly valued the solidarity received from ALP and government. Funde and Ntshinga were from different backgrounds and had different styles but both were very effective; both had children born in Australia. In 1990 Ntshinga became chief representative though Funde’s return was delayed until 1992. Most activists see Funde as a remarkably successful leader. Irene Gale recalls that Australians were impressed to hear about apartheid from those who suffered. Colin Tatz remembers him as having a good media presence. Audrey McDonald found him a ‘great person to work with’. South Africans found him particularly effective. To Lorna Zoë he ‘had knowledge, he had vision and … endless energy and enthusiasm. … He also managed to hold us together’. Pat Wagner sees Eddie and Nosizwe as ‘so

179 Interviews with L Simons, J. Harris, Sydney, 30 October 2005.
dynamic in their work that one felt compelled to support the ANC’. Even if there were criticisms, the ANC contributed to progressive forces inside Australia; it supported, if not always regularly owing to pressing demands, the peace, anti-racist, and solidarity movements.  

If the role of earlier anti-apartheid bodies had been to maintain the sanctions campaign and trail blaze the arrival of the ANC, by the late 1980s a web of new support groups were important players. Strongest in major cities, all these movements tried to penetrate more widely. Funde visited many rural towns: for example in 1984 assisted by Ruan Maud and AA-M, he visited Ballarat to force the cancellation of a projected talk by Pretoria’s ambassador. WACARE had sorties to Albany, York, and the Pilbara. In rural Geraldton, Nambitha Madikiza organised a Mandela release celebration. ANC support groups formed on the north and south coasts of NSW. AAM (Victoria) and local activists held the first rural Shell protest in 1988 on the Hume Highway at Wangaratta. From Brisbane to Darwin, and from Canberra to Perth, activists kept up the pressure. They were helped in this endeavour by consistent political and civic society allies. 

**Inside the AAM (2): Parties, unions, civic society, and the media**

At one level, the movement comprised ‘single issue’ anti-apartheid groups. Yet a range of other political and civic bodies, such as parties, churches, and unions had firm anti-apartheid policies. There was little support from right wing parties or business, though by the late 1980s Funde persuaded the South African Australian Business Council in Sydney that their interests lay in a post-apartheid South Africa and some of its members joined the Mandela Foundation. A myriad of individuals and increasingly the media lent their weight to this pressure.

**The political parties**

The position of Australian political parties on apartheid was generally favourable to liberation movements. New Zealand Labour and ALP support at leadership and grassroots levels significantly aided the ANC mission. The ALP was in power federally from 1983 to 1996 and helped steer the Commonwealth away from Thatcher’s pro-apartheid policies. The ALP government gradually increased its material support for victims of apartheid and, in the 1990s, the ANC itself. Funde carefully built cross factional support in the ALP and ACTU, whose ex-leader Cliff Dolan joined Prime Minister Hawke and ex-Prime Minister Whitlam as visible supporters. As early as 1984, Funde was able to have some input into draft ALP national policy on South Africa, though he reported to HQ the final resolution was watered down. While government allowed him consultation with Foreign Affairs, there appeared ‘a

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180 APM 3/25: H. McCue to O. Tambo, 26 February 1988; Martin, Wagner, Gale interviews; ‘Ndumiso Ntshinga’ AAR, 134-7; MFA Newsletter, August 1992; ‘Lorna Zoe’ and ‘Audrey McDonald’, AAR.

181 Funde interview, Ballarat News, 26 September 1984; AAG Melbourne minutes, 7 October 1984; Chronicle (Wangaratta) 9, 23 May 1988.

182 I owe this fact to Eddie Funde.
reluctance to officially deal with the movement as the legitimate representative of the South African people, though there is acknowledgement of that fact. Australia’s seat on the UN Council for Namibia did help it somewhat with recognition of liberation movements.  

Small left and centre parties lent valuable assistance. The CPA, an early opponent of racism at home and apartheid abroad, had split – several times – by the time the ANC arrived and was about to split again. A pro-Chinese offshoot gave support to the PAC. Subsequent splits saw formation of the Socialist Party of Australia and Association of Communist Unity. Cadres of both, and the CPA, and their associated civic bodies and unions gave strong support to the ANC. Australian Democrats and Greens also were anti-apartheid. The non sectarian work of the movement and the ANC ensured a more or less seamless interaction with supporters from any political party.

Things were very different on the right. While some conservatives, notably Fraser, played an important anti-apartheid role, they were a small minority. By 1984 the Liberal Party, observed Funde, was ‘relaxing their anti-apartheid stance’, though he sought dialogue. The National Party (NP) was further to the right, in 1984 passing resolutions opposing any restrictions on sport contact and giving ‘credit’ to apartheid’s ‘achievements’. This party, Funde noted, ‘is almost like the South African one’. Under NP rule in Queensland, he told ANC HQ, ‘Aboriginal people are having a tough time’, with suggestions that white South African immigrants were advising ‘how to maltreat the black Aboriginal people’. Queensland legislation, he stated at a rally in Adelaide, was ‘the closest thing yet to South Africa’s bantustan legislation’.

Like Muldoon’s Nationals, the conservative Liberal Party opposed sanctions and was hostile to the ANC. Leader John Howard in 1985 threatened to close the ANC office if elected. In Perth in 1984 Funde heard a Liberal Party spokesperson attack the ANC as a ‘terrorist’ body whose office would be ‘closed immediately the Liberals take over power’. Funde spared no effort to educate such people, a tactic that bore fruit later in the decade when some conservatives became more supportive. A measure of bipartisan support developed through Parliamentarians against Apartheid. Some prominent Liberals such as Downer and Phillip Ruddock joined, but not Howard. Colin Hollis of the ALP served as chairperson, and visited the ANC in Lusak in 1988. Other prominent ANC supporters in parliament included ALP Senators Bruce Childs, Kerry Sibraa, and Pat Giles.

The trade unions

The union connection, decade by decade, was long and deep. Peak union bodies in Australia and New Zealand, the ACTU and FOL, were strongly supportive. In September 1981, after the arrest of 305 black unionists, the ACTU called a week of action. In October 1985, it coordinated a week of union protest and pressed for mandatory economic sanctions, monitoring of Australian companies in South Africa and Namibia, and release of all union and political prisoners. It urged affiliated unions to act. The ACTU sought to strengthen ties with black South African unions. State labour councils supported anti-apartheid protests and hosted numerous liberation movement visitors.\(^{186}\)

Individual unions were equally solid. In Sydney they were instrumental in the establishment of the ANC office. In Victoria, left wing unions led by John Halfpenny rendered meaningful solidarity. In South Australia, maritime workers, metalworkers, and builders gave strong support to CARE and the ANC. To Irene Gale, the SUA was probably the strongest supporter, politically and materially, taking industrial action against ships and having its members come to protests. CARE always had individual ships as members and seamen on those ships sent donations. It was the same sort of solidarity in ports such as Sydney and Fremantle, where in 1985 not only did tug crews delay a ship, but a SUA member went on board to protest the crew’s poor food and wages. Maritime Union of Australia Port Adelaide Veterans Association members still recall when in 1986 they invited Funde to the container terminal, where he addressed wharfies: ‘There was a South African ship in port and we were refused entry, but we imposed an eight day black ban’. When shipping agents complained that they threatened trade and would lose their jobs, the WWF secretary stated it was a moral issue to support their South African comrades.\(^{187}\)

Many other unions rendered support. The Food Preservers’ Union sent a generous donation to help inquest costs after the 1982 death of Neil Aggett of the African Food and Canning Workers’ Union. Equity cut off South African access to Australian media and literary productions. The Miners’ Federation strongly backed the Shell boycott. Funde successfully toured central and northern Queensland mining centres in May 1989, winning ‘even greater support within mining communities’, warning corporations that ruthlessly exploited black South Africans could use the same tactics in Australia.\(^{188}\)

The ethos of union solidarity is captured in the life of Andrew Molotsane. He was active in the Black Allied Workers Union and then SACTU and the ANC. In 1981

he successfully toured New Zealand. In 1983 he addressed meetings in Melbourne of the Commonwealth Student Conference and ACTU Congress. Molotsane told the ACTU the struggle of Australian workers was the struggle of South African workers; ‘the great fraternity between the Australian and South African workers has been tempered in struggle’.189

Unions took up individual cases of repression such as treason charges against National Union of Metalworkers General Secretary Moses Mayekiso. In the late 1980s, the Free Moses Mayekiso Campaign, based in the Australian Metal Workers Union and BWIU and supported by left parties, gave strong support during and after the 18-month treason trial. After his release, Mayekiso came to Australia in 1990, creating a strong impression on local unionists who continued to campaign to pay the enormous legal fees. Unions, along with UAW and anti-apartheid movements, supported refugees in Angola and Tanzania, with SUA coordinating collection and shipping of goods in the Victims of Apartheid Material Aid Campaign. Maritime, building, mining, clothing, transport, metal, teachers and numerous other unions all expressed solidarity, joined rallies, supported sanctions, and in many ways drove the movement forward.190

Union aid developed in a new way in the 1980s. The ACTU’s aid arm, Australian People for Health Education and Development Abroad (APHEDA), mightily assisted the ANC in a range of development projects, including training and purchase of equipment. APHEDA and the ANC had offices in Trades Hall, Sydney and Programme director Helen McCue regularly visited the ANC in Lusaka and Tanzania, consulting with Tambo, Thomas Nkobi, Henry Makgothi and Mohamed Tikly, with whom she developed a plan of assistance. This was complemented by practical training sponsored by the Special Assistance Program for South Africans and Namibians. The ANC’s National Scholarship Committee in Tanzania and Education Department in Zambia nominated candidates.191

The significance of APHEDA is that while government policy did not support liberation offices, it did give considerable aid through APHEDA’s humanitarian work. That way it could support the ANC without being accused of supporting ‘armed struggle’. APHEDA and Funde had good relations with Hayden, even closer with Evans. APHEDA also played an important role in an organisational way and in helping shift public and government opinion. The opening of ANC and APHEDA offices neatly coincided and McCue and Funde soon developed a close understanding, working to bring together unions, churches, and women’s groups behind the ANC. When the Australian ANCSC was established, APHEDA gave substantial administrative and secretarial support.192

192 McCue interview; APM 1/5: H. Magkgothi to ANC, 26 September 1986; APM 17/234: ANCSC minutes, 7 March 1989; McCue, Funde interviews.
Australian teachers, including Donna Burns and Ailsa Purdon, worked in Mazimbu. ANC officials and students came to Australia for training, including ‘Barto’ la Guma and ‘Paige’ Boikanyo of the Department of Information and Publicity in 1986, and Victor Moche in 1987. There was on-the-job computer training in Lusaka for the ANC Department of Education and courses in Zimbabwe. The number of ANC students and workers coming to Australia increased in 1989–90. They strengthened the ANC in Australia, freeing Funde to concentrate on diplomacy. COSATU officials visited New Zealand and Australia in 1989 to study health and safety legislation and build solidarity. In general, the union contribution was invaluable, reliable, and ongoing.193

Churches, artists, intellectuals, and the media

The Australian Council of Churches (ACC), their state councils, and the Uniting Church, and their New Zealand equivalents, were most consistent. The ACC offered scholarships to ANC students, strong political support, and secured grants to help the ANC Office. In 1988, the Uniting Church asked its churches to support ANC/ SWAPO financially. Visits from prominent anti-apartheid clergy such as Boesak in 1984, Tutu on several occasions, Reverends Xundu and Napier in 1986 and Gqiba in 1988 were strongly supported. Tutu’s 1987 presence at the Uniting Church’s National Youth Convention was effective; he spoke to youth for two weeks and the church formed a South Africa Support Group to retain their interest. The Catholic Church gave some support, given the prominent role in South Africa of Archbishop Hurley; after a delegation to South Africa, the Archbishop of Adelaide spoke out strongly. Boesak’s visit brought some support from Lutheran churches. Anglicans in general were helpful, but the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney refused to have Tutu speak in his cathedral. Reverend Dorothy McRae-McMahon, who hosted Tutu in her church and held church services for slain ANC figures, leading to death threats, notes that when the ACC supported the ANC, some churches, such as the Salvation Army, left the body.194

Academics were more indirectly active. For example, Richard Thompson in New Zealand and Colin Tatz in Australia wrote widely disseminated pamphlets exposing the crimes of apartheid. In Melbourne, David Dorward, David Tucker, and David Phillips, in Sydney Deryck Schreuder, in Canberra Donald Denoon, in Adelaide Paul Nursey-Bray and Norman Etherington, and in Perth Penelope Hetherington spoke out in the media or to students. Etherington ‘felt part of it’ in a South Australia led by anti-racist Don Dunstan. South Africans Klaas Woldring in Lismore and Saul Bastomsky in Melbourne and AAM veteran Peter McGregor in Nepean joined other academics in isolating apartheid through the academic boycott. The cultural boycott was not widely observed but supported by the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations. Overall, academics may not have played a leading role, but helped

Australians understand apartheid’s background, allowing the movement a better hearing.\(^\text{195}\)

Writers, artists, musicians, and cartoonists all chimed in: Nobel Prize winner Patrick White was as eloquent in his condemnation of apartheid as rock musicians Peter Garrett, ‘Spy vs Spy’, and ‘Crowded House’ were generous with benefit performances, many organised by South African activist artist Enver Larney. Cartoonists such as Tom Scott, Bruce Petty and Allan Moir targeted the absurdity and morbid violence of apartheid. Scott started drawing anti-apartheid cartoons at school and university in the 1960s. He emerged as New Zealand’s leading satiric cartoonist. Working briefly on The Evening Standard, he was fired for refusing to stop doing anti-apartheid pieces. He survived editorial pressure to desist from his barbs against apartheid as leading columnist for the widely read Listener, where his column reached a million readers. Scott joined protests but balanced commitment with objectivity, at times taking aim at HART’ s foibles. HART News, despite its reputation for radicalism, found some of his submissions too severe, but Scott realised if they made people angry he was effective. Muldoon tried to ban him from CHOGM conferences in India and Australia; Indira Gandhi and Fraser overrode the attempts. Anti-apartheid views were a minority when Scott started cartooning but by 1981 they were mainstream, with scarcely a journalist opposed to the tour. Visiting Wellington after his release, Nelson Mandela was mindful of this positive media role, turning down a state invitation to attend instead a Parliamentary Press Gallery meeting.\(^\text{196}\)

Mass media were slow to oppose apartheid consistently. Not until the 1980s did editorials more consistently condemn apartheid and appreciate the role of the AAM and liberation movements often demonised as ‘rat bags’ or ‘terrorists’. At first, the media largely ignored tours by liberation leaders. The media crudely depicted Soweto ’76 as ‘riots’. In New Zealand by 1981 widespread media support accompanied anti-apartheid protests, but in Australia some conservative media continued to support reaction in South Africa until the bitter end.

The Australian report on the 1986 Canberra Embassy incident was more concerned with the status of Ambassador Bastiaanse than the need to end apartheid, reflecting the conservatism of this Murdoch-owned newspaper. It had invited PW. Botha and Buthelezi to write feature articles. For three years it allowed a paid and skilfully written, yet propagandistic, fortnightly advertisement of Pretoria’s policies by subsequent Ambassador David Tothill, to appear cunningly disguised as a column. The cost over three years, according to Tothill, was A$174 000. It was one of the most blatant cases of ongoing support for Pretoria in the press. In the 1980s there were three to seven South African sub editors on the monopoly Perth newspaper The West Australian, which local activists saw as blatantly antagonistic to the ANC. All around Australia, anti-apartheid people wrote letters contesting media bias on South Africa.\(^\text{197}\)

\(^{195}\) SACARE News, September 1979; Bastomsky interview/correspondence; Etherington interview.  
\(^{196}\) APM 1/8: SAANCSG leaflet, November 1990; APM 1/2: SAANCG letter, October 1988; HJP: SADAF Newsletter, September 1979; Scott interview.  
On the other hand, less reactionary owners and editors such as those on The Age, who invited Oliver Tambo to contribute a feature article, presented far less succour to Pretoria. Even here, it was a long battle: Jeanne Daly had to challenge the short sightedness of The Age’s travel editor who had enthused over South African tourism. The electronic media were made more objective by unfolding events inside South Africa by way of nightly images of police dogs and sjambok whips tearing into defenceless people. TV and radio from both the public sector, where ABC and SBS hosted many incisive reports on apartheid, and the commercial sector contributed greatly to wider understanding of apartheid.198

The movement was too early to operate in the Internet world, but it developed creative and effective techniques to expose apartheid. It built its own alternative media, with newsletters, books, cartoons, films and posters, drawing on liberation movement creativity. It confronted powerful media empires, but for a while turned them to its own ends, using star performers, massive rock concerts, and debate. All this required much work and skill. Yet the movement was able to exploit an initially sceptical media because it was broad based, united in a single aim to destroy apartheid, and firm, if flexible in tactics. Behind all these organisations and specialists stood the public, many of whom increasingly boycotted South African goods, attended anti-apartheid marches and concerts, heard anti-apartheid speakers and sermons, and learned from media reports. What they did not always hear were the internal debates.

**Inside the AAM (3): Unity in diversity**

How did all these components fit together? On what did they differ? We should not imagine their history as an unproblematic, triumphal progression: there were internal divisions. Yet there was substantial unity in diversity. Groups had different histories and views on politics and tactics, were widely scattered and operated at a time of great tension. Some thought HART too radical. There were ANC–PAC rivalries. When, after 1981, the ANC stepped up its activity there, HART stuck to its policy of dual recognition as long as the UN/OAU recognised both. Matters came to head in November 1982 when Michael Lapsley confronted PAC supporters in Wellington, saying some people would still be sending cheques to the PAC in Dar es Salaam long after the ANC flag was flying over the Union Buildings in Pretoria. Still, as Richards observes, ideological differences, if always costly, never greatly surfaced in the public arena. It was similar in Australia, where the ANC and PAC tended to keep out of each other’s way, though rivalries played out inside some solidarity groups.199

There were tactical differences. A ‘single issue’ focus on sport saw frustration expressed after 1981 by ANC and Maori supporters but on the other hand HART moved more toward economic sanctions. In Australia, difficulty arose between CARE and ANC over organisation. Funde in his first year had ‘fruitful’ co-operation with CARE and appreciated their rejection of the PAC. He realised the movement had

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198 Tambo Papers, B61 c2.4.2: E. Funde to T. Mbeki, 30 June 1986.
quite different support groups in each state. Building a better co-ordinated national structure became a priority. Supported by Wooton, Funde initiated a new overarching structure, the Free Namibia Free South Africa Campaign (FNFSAC) in November 1985. CARE, the Luthuli Group and AAAM (Victoria) disagreed with what they saw as a more elitist approach and duplication of effort in FNFSAC, which was ineffective. Funde also initiated parallel ANC support organisations that were more successful and brought valuable new resources and wider public support. The FNFSAC experiment revealed different organisational models. Funde favoured a hierarchical model with eminent persons as patrons at the top, a secretariat, and local activists at the base, as in the UK. CARE saw this as ill suited, given Australia’s anti-authority ‘tall poppy’ syndrome and large distances. Behind Funde’s distancing from the CARE network was his wariness of working with a body closely involved in Aboriginal forces that might be very critical of his ‘host’ government.200

The relationship with indigenous activists was contradictory. CARE and HART supported indigenous struggles, linking them to apartheid. Both movements undoubtedly increased public awareness of racism, but there was lingering resentment among indigenous people about lack of meaningful reciprocity. The issue was complex. The ANC chief representative was in a difficult situation. Under attack from conservative parties, he also faced pressure from Canberra not to get ‘involved’ in Australian politics. It was of strategic importance for the ANC to focus on its main concerns, but an interesting question is whether liberation movements were ‘guests’ of government. They did have to give an undertaking to government to ‘abide by the rules’ when opening offices. Foreign Affairs wasted no time in 1984 in impressing upon Funde that Canberra would

\[\text{not condone the use of extreme language in press releases … Phrases such as ‘the way forward to victory lies in systematic combination of mass action and organised revolutionary violence’ are contrary to the guidelines relating to the establishment of such information offices in Australia, and specifically to the undertakings given by the ANC …}\]

The West was more comfortable with civil rights than armed struggle. Wooton concedes the Uniting Church’s strong support for ANC/SWAPO, including armed struggle, meant ‘a lot of people left the church’, but ‘a lot of people joined.’ Some made donations conditional on money not going to support ‘violence’, requiring the anti-apartheid movement to explain the historical necessity for armed struggle or to accommodate flexibly such requests.201

The ANC felt that if it too closely associated with Aboriginal issues, it risked jeopardising support from the same public (and power brokers) with anti-Aboriginal prejudices. Yet, Funde’s pragmatic solution to distance himself from direct support


did not stop a (sometimes selective) wider solidarity. Funde did tour Aboriginal
centres. Aboriginal bodies were invited to AAM activities. A few Aboriginal leaders,
notably Kevin Cook, were active in ANC support groups. Cook had supported the
movement from the 1970s as a unionist and in the 1980s hosted Tutu and Tambo
at Tranby Aboriginal Cooperative College. He became a close supporter because
‘the ANC tried to develop a relationship with Aboriginal people when they first
came out here, whereas the PAC didn’t’. Cook sums up the dilemma of black
solidarity: as an ANCSC executive member, he organised Mandela’s 1990 meetings
with Aboriginal leaders, yet agreed with Foley that Mandela ‘should have said
something about our struggle’. Lloyd Martin adds that personally, he and some
other ANC people ‘did not have a problem and the solidarity was there’. Tambo and
Mandela privately told Aboriginal leaders they would oppose all discrimination.
Canberra also made a connection. Foreign Affairs Minister Evans, addressing the
1989 ANC conference stated: ‘In opposing apartheid, we are also acknowledging
that Aboriginal Australians have been victims of racism.’ The root problem was
Australian society; under pressure from big capital, Canberra moved further away
from land rights. The ANC lacked resources to devote to Aboriginal concerns but
was ‘obviously on side’; but now in government, had ‘the task to assist Aboriginal
people in their struggle’. 202

Funde had to work it out as he went along. There was no ANC policy on the
matter. His first tour of Western Australia in 1984 coincided with a massive Aboriginal
land rights rally. Funde indicated he could not – as virtually a diplomat – speak, but as
CARE members moved through the crowd distributing handbills with his black face
and liberation slogans, a chord was struck among hundreds of cowboy hat wearing
stockmen down from the Pilbara, a thousand miles away. When Aboriginal leader
Robert Riley emerged from within parliament and spontaneously invited Funde
to speak, he gave a brief but moving address. Reporting to ANC HQ, he noted the
‘lively response to my participation at an Aboriginal Land Rights Rally on the steps of
Parliament House’. 203

Wider regional mobilisation was difficult, given limited funding, but Pacific
solidarity was furthered by conferences in Japan, Philippines and Australia. In Sydney in
September 1989 the Australia and Pacific Regional Conference against Apartheid for a
Democratic South Africa attracted governments, unions, churches, and anti-apartheid,
indigenous, NGO and women’s groups from 13 countries. The ANC built ties with
bodies as diverse as the Kiribati Trade Union Federation and the Vanuatu government.
The ANC’s Thabo Mbeki urged continued international pressure. Makhosazana Njobe
of the ANC Women’s Section made a successful tour of Australia and New Zealand,
supported by the UAW. She spoke to women’s, union, NGO and government bodies,
visiting not only major cities but also regional and Aboriginal centres. 204

202 ‘Lloyd Martin’; Martin, L. Gale interviews; ‘Kevin Cook’; AAR, 46-50; APM 15/70: MFA Release, 15 September 1989;
204 APM 3/27: Report for Anti-Apartheid Asia Oceania Workshop, Tokyo, 1988; speeches; APM 1/4: Funde to Kiribati Trade
Union, Fiji Trade Unions, 4 July 1990; ANCSG 1990 Report; 2/3: M. Njobe to E. Funde, 11 January 1988; APM 1/8:
The late 1980s saw last desperate attempts by apartheid backers to stave off the inevitable. An assassination attempt by neo-Fascists nearly killed Funde and his family. It was not the first attack: in 1982 bricks and bullets hit Colin Tatz’s house after he gave media talks. In 1984 a petrol bomb was thrown at John Brink’s home after he spoke at a memorial for slain ANC activist Jenny Curtis. South African embassies were involved in ‘dirty tricks’, but if no direct evidence of foul play on the 1989 attack exists, Funde remembers the inappropriate remarks by Ambassador Tothill that it ‘couldn’t have happened to a nicer guy’. Prime Minister Hawke advised the embassy not to issue offensive statements.\(^{205}\)

The 1980s thus brought new challenges. Coordinating diverse forces dispersed across the wide spaces of Australasia was a convoluted task. Tensions arose at times, but the movement remained united around anti-apartheid goals. As the decade closed, there was cautious hope for real change in South Africa.

The 1990s: The new South Africa, and a new role for the AAM

The 1990s were a challenging, if fulfilling, time for the anti-apartheid movement. By 1990 on all significant fronts much had been achieved. Despite Nelson Mandela’s release, things remained tense in South Africa, while economic recession in Australia made funds harder to obtain. However, Mandela’s celebrated visit in 1990 energised the movement.\(^{206}\)

Mandela met the prime minister, stressing the ANC’s ‘deep appreciation’ of the support of the government and people. He told a crowd of 30 000 at the Sydney Opera House he could ‘feel the solidarity of Australians and others for 27 years through thick prison walls’; on Robben Island ‘we, prisoners of apartheid, whispered to each other about your very healthy and militant action of disavowal against an all white Springbok team’. He addressed large meetings in Sydney and Melbourne, praising the longterm support of unions. He also praised the rendition of *Nkosi Sikelel’iAfrika* by Sydney’s Solidarity Choir: ‘To see a choir of whites … thousands of miles from my own fatherland, singing the national anthem with such facility was very inspiring.’

Catching a train to the event, Audrey McDonald felt ‘it seemed everyone was going to see Mandela’. To Lynnette Simons, ‘the whole city went wild’. Colin Tatz, who had last watched Mandela at the Treason Trial, was overwhelmed by his ‘magic presence’.\(^{207}\)

Yet the legacy of racism in Australia had not magically evaporated. Mandela was censured by Aboriginal activists Gary Foley, Michael Mansell and Roberta Sykes who criticised ANC inconsistency in failing to support black struggles. Fraser derided the protests, arguing there was no comparison between apartheid and Australia; Sykes countered that white dispossession of black people surely had much in common. The


\(^{206}\) ANCSC 1990 Annual Report; Martin interview.

ANC mission scheduled a meeting of Mandela with representatives of Aboriginal people ‘involved in a struggle to retain their cultural heritage, for Land Rights and for a better social status … to provide them with an opportunity to share their views with our delegation’. In New Zealand, the debate was similar: Whatarangi Winiata said Mandela should have travelled ‘as a guest of Maoridom’ or on a joint invitation from both partners of the Treaty of Waitangi. Syd Jackson felt the ANC’s policy of not commenting on racism in other countries ‘let Mandela off the hook’, but Eva Rickard of Mana Motuhake welcomed Mandela ‘with open arms’.208

Direct aid to the ANC skyrocketed. Helen McCue, Funde and Tikly convinced Gareth Evans to give a substantial A$20m package. Agencies relocated to South Africa. APHEDA now focused on capacity building of democratic institutions, unions, and media, building nonracial sport, literacy, occupational health, workplace violence, and AIDS. In Limpopo and Winterveld an Aids education programme grew out of a longterm relationship with Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa. At Soshanguve, APHEDA funded youth, women’s cooperatives and training programmes. It funded repatriation of exiles. There were union-to-union exchanges on training and nonracial pay structures. Australian labour specialists went to work with COSATU, NUMSA, and Naledi. APHEDA directed more than R1m to help integrate sports and brought National Olympic Sports Congress (NOSC) leader Bill Jardine to Australia to raise funds. In 1990 alone APHEDA gave over A$4m in assistance to ANC training. It funded workshops in Lusaka and Harare, gave scholarships to 360 Somafco students, and hosted journalist Allister Sparks on a tour of Australia to study multicultural broadcasting. Another valuable project of this time was Bruce Haigh’s Australian South Africa Training Trust.209

Political protests continued. When in March 1990 SA Chamber of Mines chief executive Tom Main attended the World Gold Conference in Perth, he faced a vigorous protest organised by CARE and unions. Soon after, the ANC Support Group of WA and WACARE formed a Sanctions Monitoring Group. The Mandela Foundation led a rally against the Boipatong massacre in June 1992. The arrival of the first South African cricket team in over two decades saw debates over its racial composition and the timing of lifting sanctions. The movement held discussions with government and cricket authorities, urging that disadvantaged sports in South Africa should receive tour proceeds. The match was not opposed as such, for desegregation in cricket was occurring, but outside the WACA huge banners supported the ANC, activists did a toyi toyi and were permitted to distribute ‘Hit Apartheid for Six!’ leaflets inside. Rugby, where desegregation had barely begun, was complicated. In Sydney, the SAANCSG encouraged the Australian Rugby League to support anti-apartheid policy.210

209 Evans and Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations, 296; APM 1/4: Funde to Nzo, 5 October 1990; McCue, Davis interviews; APM 1/9: ANCSC minutes, 10 April 1990; APM 13/51: APHEDA Report, December 1990, APHEDA to Ntshinga, 8 April 1993; C. van Wyk, Now Listen Here (Johannesburg: STE, 2003), 222, 154.
In New Zealand, HART, cautious to allow ties with a regime still lashing out violently, maintained its boycott policy. It hosted NOSC and ANC leader Arnold Stofile, who agreed. ANC Sports Desk head Steve Tshwete, eager to open space for negotiations, differed. Agreement came with the NZRFU that affirmative action and irreversible change were necessary to end bans, but Craven still prevaricated. In February 1992, NOSC and HART disagreed with a Tshwete statement that integration had occurred. After HART criticised the decision of ANC leaders to approve, against opposition from its own membership, the All Black Tour after the June 1992 Boipatong Massacre – the ANC had withdrawn from CODESA and urged a sports moratorium – Tshwete unleashed, in Minto’s words, a torrent of ‘HART-bashing’. Stofile agreed the ANC had helped frustrate international solidarity ‘through its conciliatory posture and its related criticisms of its supporters’. Yet the pace of change was fast and the new course set. HART did not proceed with protests and at the end of 1992 disbanded. The key factors, noted Minto, were attacks by Tshwete and that, with the falling away of the boycott, there was little room left for a ‘protest oriented’ movement. If understandable as part of overall political comprise, it was a sad end to a history of great commitment and sacrifice, made more poignant by Stofile’s comment that the boycott, ‘the only weapon that worked’, had been lifted ‘prematurely’.

Besides resumption of sports contacts, there was a marked increase in educational and cultural exchange. One initiative came from Perth based Aboriginal troupe, Black Swan Theatre. Mindful of similar colonial/racist pasts, but also the power of culture, the theatre, consulting with ANC leaders in Australia, linked up with the ANC’s Wally Serote to arrange performances in South Africa. Probably because of the strong ANC presence in the Australian anti-apartheid movement, the theatre made a point of linking directly with the ANC’s Department of Culture as well as with grassroots groups.

Understanding these confusing years of change was facilitated by a steady flow of top level visitors, including Walter Sisulu and Frene Ginwala in 1991, Thabo Mbeki and Albie Sachs, and the Chris Hani Memorial Tour of Charles Nqakula, Thenjiwe Mthintso and John Gomomo in 1993. ANC units now operated openly. The ANC WA unit sent delegates to ANC regional conferences. Spokespersons Glen Mashinini and Wendy Rose established a state Election Fund Raising Committee to negotiate funds for the election from unions and the ALP.

Australia assisted the transition to democracy with finance, observers, advisers and aid for the 1994 election. The ANC office and support groups established a powerful election fund raising committee, Australians for Democracy in South Africa (ADISA) that raised ‘at least a million’. ALP assistant national secretary Ian Henderson was

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213 WACARE Papers: ANC WA Unit to L. Martin, ANC Regional Executive Committee, 19 September 1993, ANC WA Unit agenda and minutes, 5 September 1993.
seconded to the ANC campaign in South Africa for several months. South Africans in Australia voted; Pat Wagner’s 79-year-old mother for the first time. Wagner and Saul Bastomsky convinced scrutinisers to accept tattered old official documents. Gough Whitlam, ADISA chair and one of few politicians to have supported the movement in the 1960s, appropriately was a scrutiniser in Sydney, where a memorable victory celebration took place in Petersham Town Hall. At Mandela’s inauguration, it was emblematic that present were not only such notables as Fraser and Hawke but also grassroots activists such as Tom and Audrey McDonald, Sheila Suttner, and Sybil Wakefield.214

By 1994 white supremacist regimes in southern Africa had dissolved. In 1978, Goldsworthy had characterised Australian opinion as ‘little concerned’ with the region, but the vocal anti-apartheid campaigns of the 1980s and triumphal images of Mandela freed in the 1990s reinserted South Africa into the Australian gaze in a manner not seen since 1899. Australia’s subsequent downgrading of relations with Africa in favour of closer ties with Asia suggests its South African involvement was transitory, but the ties forged had considerable momentum and after 1990 trade and labour contacts increased. If the 1890s had seen Australian miners contribute to a racist labour aristocracy in South Africa, then the ending of apartheid saw unionists in both countries working together as new forms of transnational solidarity emerged across the Indian Ocean. Australian solidarity was reciprocated when COSATU in 1997/8 and 2005 supported Australian workers facing harsh anti-union, anti-democratic laws.215

New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger in 1996 formally apologised for the 1981 Tour. Soon after, a motion drafted by Trevor Richards and moved in parliament by Helen Clark unanimously passed, acknowledging the role of popular opposition to apartheid and pledging future bilateral endeavour.216

Just as governments settled their scores, so in the 1990s anti-apartheid groups had to adapt. By 1992, the ANC was reorienting the movement away from sanctions to reconstruction. Ntshinga, who in 1991 became chief representative was aware that Australians would lose interest in South Africa when sanctions ended and sought to build an Australasia–South Africa Council.217

On a grassroots level, solidarity continued, not always without contradiction. In 1993 when the ANC Solidarity Group’s Sybil Wakefield organised a successful ANCWL visit to Adelaide, liaising with Gertrude Shope to bring Dikeledi Magadzi and Ntombentsha Nciza for a training programme, a spat developed with male comrades over representation and security fears (exacerbated by recent racist attacks). Personality clashes and gender insensitivity were apparent. The ANCWL women

216 Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, 252.
strongly supported Wakefield, who was invited to attend their conference and later represented South Australia at Mandela’s inauguration. Yet all these South Africans were stalwarts of the struggle and such problems did not stop them uniting to support the ANC.\(^{218}\)

Solidarity took new forms. When ANC Support Group of WA activists Marc Newhouse and Marc Cox went to South Africa in 1992, they sought out groups in real need. They worked with the Prisoners’ Organisation for Human Rights to alleviate prisoner suffering and lobbied for their right to vote. Back in Perth they established West Australians for South African Solidarity (WASAS) that lobbied Codesa for these rights. Mass protests eventually saw the Electoral Act amended to allow most prisoners the vote. WASAS also helped with reconstruction and development, organising several brigades of unionists, students, parliamentarians and others for project initiatives from South African communities. In the end, lack of funding meant they were not sustainable, but the brigades created people-to-people solidarity with a profound impact: Angie Hartwig saw in them a two way learning experience between Australian and South African women.\(^{219}\)

Aid groups remained active. APHEDA kept programmes going, but saw its work diminished under conservative rule. In Sydney, the Boomerang Project raised funds for AIDS orphans. From New Zealand, Te Tuao Tawahi/Volunteer Service Abroad volunteers drove projects. Yet after 1994 the AAM’s \textit{raison d’être} evaporated: apartheid was dead, even if its socio-economic legacy endured. In 1994, the ANC office in Sydney closed and its papers went to Fort Hare. In early 1994 the ANCSG of WA dissolved, remitting its funds to the election, and the ANC unit disbanded; counterparts in other states did the same, ending an interesting and little known chapter in the ANC’s overseas history. CARE National dissolved in 1994; the Mandela Foundation in 1996. WACARE lingered a little longer, trying to generate solidarity with post-apartheid South Africa and democratic forces in Swaziland and opposing local racism. HART had already dissolved in 1992. The anti-apartheid movement in Australasia had ended.\(^{220}\)

**New challenges, old lessons: Assessing significance**

The legacy of the movement is manifold. A new generation of leaders draw on their experiences in it. Helen Clark, New Zealand prime minister is one; Queensland premier Peter Beattie and Northern Territory chief minister Clare Martin are others. Once derided by right wingers as ‘rat bags’, the movement is now a model of an acceptable social movement featured in a Sydney school kit on ‘active citizenship’. It engaged wide sections of Australasian society. Thousands took part in rallies and


concerts. Unions imposed bans. Writers spoke out eloquently. Churches intensified their stance. Musicians and artists joined boycotts. Governments had to act. Taken together, the activities helped create a stronger anti-racist ethos. Kevin Cook thinks Australians ‘learnt a lot about racism from being involved in anti-apartheid activities’. Jane Harris believes it ‘helped Australians confront their own racism’.221

Another important legacy was strengthening multiculturalism, but this has been under attack since Howard’s rise in 1996. Fraser, most consistent of conservative politicians on apartheid, maintains his firm adherence to anti-racism in clear contrast to Howard, who vilified the ANC, refused to apologise to Aboriginal peoples over the ‘stolen generation’, and won an election exploiting fears of refugees. Fraser feels today’s Liberal Party would have supported apartheid. The 1990s saw the need to understand old lessons. Reconciliation became a major issue. Lawyer Andrea Durbach came to Australia in 1989 after strenuous political trial work in the ‘Upington 25’ case, where her clients faced the death penalty and after the assassination of her barrister, Anton Lubowski. In Australia she worked with policy makers and visiting South Africans (including Albie Sachs and Arthur Chaskalson) eager to see how Australian law reform might assist in building constitutional democracy. Yet she saw negative trends: South Africa’s lesson for Australia was that, before reconciliation, a country must publicly confront its past and make reparations. Visiting Truth and Reconciliation commissioner Alex Boraine found it ‘breathtaking that a government can refuse to acknowledge the damage that was done, the damage that continues’.222

Today many South Africans once active in the anti-apartheid movement see something terribly familiar in Australian ‘terrorist’ legislation. Recent migrant, novelist Johann Coetzee, compares the laws with apartheid legislation. ACTU President Burrow concurs that under so broad and dangerous definitions of ‘terrorist’, the AAM would have been outlawed. Meredith Burgmann warns ‘if we were doing AAM stuff today we would be in jail’; Peter McGregor feels ‘many of the things we once fought for might need to be fought for again’. To Andrea Durbach, things have gone full cycle: South Africa has turned to democracy, taking some of its lessons from an Australia now moving away from democracy, needing to take lessons from the new South Africa. Yet anti-apartheid people are often still involved. After all, as Burgmann reminds us, its lesson was simple: ‘international solidarity works’.223

Together these and others whose testimonies appear above – who constitute the Australasian exemplars of what Thörn terms ‘key activists’ of the movement’s web: ‘the activist public official’ (such as Fraser), ‘exile activist’ (the Brinks, Funde), ‘movement organiser’ (the Gales, Richards) and ‘movement intellectual’ (Tatz) – helped strengthen solidarity and anti-racism by direct action, education and communication.

221 Harris, Political Football, 205; Active Citizenship, Sydney, 1999; Jennett, ‘Signals’, 98; AAR 49, 119; APM 1/3: Fraser to Funde, 20 June 1991; Fraser interview.
to combat apartheid misinformation. Yet Thörn’s emphasis on social movements of solidarity does not quite appreciate the power of state action; it was, after all, a major aim of the movement to influence governments. As Fraser remarks, states took the major decisions.224

In assessing the movement’s significance, one might argue that anti-apartheid governments made it a mere auxiliary and we should not exaggerate Australasia’s role in ending apartheid. This ignores the interconnectedness of struggles, the deep global contestations over sanctions and ever present temptations to accommodation with the regime, as well as the need for grassroots pressure. Fraser did not feel pressured: ‘For a while the non-government arena was trying to get the Australian government to change its policy. Once I became PM and it was clear that opposition to apartheid was going to become a permanent feature of Australian policy there was no need for that’. We must give due credit to post-1972 prime ministers – excluding Muldoon – for their policies. But the evidence adduced shows the AAM carried on a concerted campaign that was successful in keeping governments on track for several reasons: its ‘enormous patience, its dogged determination, its tenacity’ (Lynnette Simons), its ‘constantly innovative and experimental methods’ (Anne Lawless), and its ‘constant work’ (Lloyd Martin). The movement by itself did not bring down apartheid. Rather, in conjunction with wider forces it helped produce an irresistible movement for change. We can exaggerate the effect of its individual components, but they were always part of a wider team. As Leslie Corbett argues, its impact was cumulative, and symbolic. The movement’s ‘prime lesson’, argues Terry Bell, ‘is democratic control from below’. There are lessons here for today’s struggles against a ubiquitous globalisation. Unity and democracy remains crucial for success, and it is possible for state and non-state actors to work together.225

Anti-apartheid activists were an amazing group, dedicated and focused. Tom Scott sums up this dedication, but also their human side, in describing Trevor Richards: ‘He was uncompromisingly honest, calm, and told it exactly like it was…. He was a consensus – a coalition – builder. I think he was a great New Zealander; and he was a rugby fan.’ These human dimensions are apparent today; it is no coincidence AAM veterans are still active in anti-racist, anti-globalisation protests. Dennis Brutus observes, ‘As we challenged apartheid in South Africa, we now have to build a global resistance movement to take on global oppression.’ The AAM was an early manifestation of this new kind of globalising process; it ensured apartheid was ‘turned into an international issue.’226

The anti-apartheid movement was able to work with some governments, change others’ policies, and campaign against still others; something today’s social movements should study. The ANC for its part always saw diplomacy, politics and armed struggle as different but related components of struggle. Solidarity did not end in 1994, and

224 Thörn, Anti-Apartheid, 13-19, 24
225 Fraser, Simons, Martin, Lawless, Corbett interviews; T. Bell and R Suttner emails.
226 Scott, Brutus interviews. In 2004, South Africa awarded Richards the Order of the Companions of OR Tambo, highest civilian award for foreign nationals, for his role in the struggle.
neither did inequality and racism. Finding a way to new forms of unity, new alliances and new solidarities is the task ahead in building viable alternatives to the current dominant forms of globalisation.